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The Purely Reflected Self
A Deconstruction of Self, East & West
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Introduction
I have spent three years as a philosophy student, writing to the topics and
material delegated by the subjects I was studying at the time. Yet now, I am allowed to
delegate myself, and write my own paper, and this section is an attempt to start at the
beginning. Martin Heidegger finds that the path to knowledge describes a circle, that in
attempting to answer a question we will not arrive from query to response, in a linear
fashion, but rather that we will find ourselves at the beginning again, that in carrying out
the asking of the question we gain instead an explanation of why we asked the question
in the first place.1
So here we are at the beginning. In my brief time with philosophy I have learned
that I distrust both philosophies which claim to reach a higher understanding of the
world through logic or argumentation, as well as philosophies which attempt to create a
structure of thought which wrestles the universe into comprehendible terms before
declaring that nothing exists beyond these terms. I intend to plow forwards without
dogmatism, faith, God, the shrugging of shoulders, or deference to authority. I believe
the subject is a dingy in a dark ocean, and that an understanding of the vastness of the
out-there must be determined on a personal level. To allow another subject to define
for us what it means to be is to have wasted the unique being which we are at this
moment. Philosophy is not archeology, digging away the erroneous until we have
unearthed a dormant, transcendent, and objective truth which we can then defer to for
the rest of our days. Rather, I believe philosophy is playing with blocks—we stack
different and interlocking structures on top of each other, and can then climb to the top
to have a look around, but before long they will slip and tumble beneath us, leaving us
on the ground again, surrounded by blocks.
I intend to begin, then, at a personal moment for myself. It is January, 2009 and I
am studying abroad in Beijing, China, visiting 雍和宮, a popular Buddhist temple in the
city. It is the first Buddhist temple I have ever been to, and as I wander through its halls,
examining the multitudes of golden Buddha statutes, my breath hanging in the frigid
Beijing air, I am aesthetically pleased, but my understanding of Buddhism is disgruntled:
Why does a philosophy so devoted to non-attachment to material objects, indeed, nonattachment to anything, find it necessary to construct expensive, ornate edifices to past
Buddhas? The very idea of a golden Buddha statue seemed fundamentally oxymoronic.
And then, as I ducked through the thronging Chinese offering up incense and
stepped gingerly over the wooden threshold into the final hall, I was awestruck. A statue
of Buddha, 6 stories tall, golden and draped in fine cloths and flowers stretched into the
darkness of the ceiling. Having foolishly hoped there would be a nice place for the public
to meditate in the temple, I had brought a towel and my meditation bench through the
subway, and now I placed these to one side and knelt on one of the pads facing the
statue, and began to meditate on my breath as Chinese people came, kowtowed, and
1

In his search for dasein’s manner of being, Being and Time 1953.
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left to either side of me. When I felt that I could not remain on the pad for another
minute without a monk coming to chase me away, I bent my torso forwards in imitation
of those around me and placed my hands upon the floor, palms down. In my mind’s eye
I saw my supplicating, lumpy form kneeling before this impossibly large, implacable,
radiantly golden image of the Buddha. In the weeks before this encounter, and, I think it
is safe to say, the twenty years before it, I had struggled with the world, attempting to
define it in terms which would allow me to hold it at a distance and turn it in my hands,
as if inspecting an intriguing toy puzzle, but the world had always frustrated these
attempts, exploding out beyond my peripheral vision time and again, defying my
attempts to circumscribe it. As I knelt before this wooden mock-up of Buddha, this urge
to make the world comprehensible, and the corresponding frustration I felt when I had
failed, washed through me and seemed to seep into the earth. My academic
background immediately framed the phenomena in terms which would allow me to
carry it away, to hold it and turn it and frown at it while scratching my chin.
The physical dimensions of my own body and that of the statue’s parallel and are
symbolic of the disparity between the dimensions of my Understanding and that of the
Buddha’s. I often set goals for myself to meditate every day, and invariably will do so for
a handful of months before the routine breaks down and I stop for a period before
picking it up again. I never had a very concrete reason for why I ought to meditate every
day, beyond what was written in books on the subject which encouraged me to do so.
But now, as I sat on my meditation bench in my modest Beijing dormitory room, I had a
reason which this large golden Buddha seems to have imparted to me: The reason I
should sit everyday is because I do not yet understand why I should sit everyday. And as
the alarm on my cheap Chinese cellphone signaled the close of the night’s meditation,
the bowing at the end of the session which had before been meaningless to me now
took on the deepest relevance. As I supplicated I envisioned a massive golden Buddha in
front of me, his outturned palm calming the universe, body wreathed in light, and I said
to him: “Forgive me, Lord Buddha, for I know nothing.”
It is, in hindsight, rather obvious that the next step in the cultivation of my
Understanding should be to the practice of acknowledging my lack of complete
knowledge. I continued in this manner for two more months, sitting every day and
ending the meditation with supplication to an imagined giant Buddha and a heartfelt
self-admonition that I knew nothing. During my time studying abroad I read the basic
teachings of Buddhism once more, this time in Chinese, and this re-introduction,
coupled with an intense vacuum of complex thought created by an environment of all
day language classes and a language pledge, caused me to bounce around several
concepts daily in my head, furious to determine the whole which I knew these
seemingly disparate parts must represent.
These concepts were: The three poisons—ignorance, greed, and anger, which
together block us from arriving at Buddha nature; the metaphor comparing the
individual to a droplet of sea spray in the ocean of everything; the saying that our
human skin is like a bag which contains but does not define our Buddha nature; and
finally, the metaphor which compares our unskillful selves to a dusty mirror—that if we
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can only clear away our trifling attachments, we would be in perfect harmony with the
world around us, like a mirror which reflects all that it receives. I was determined to
arrange these things, each of which felt powerfully true on its own, into a tidy order, like
the knots on a fisherman’s net which would all come up should one intersection be
pulled. Finally, I settled upon an answer I was pleased with—all of these things can be
hinged upon the conception of the self. The three poisons only exist because we have
attachment to ourselves as a self. Likewise, it is the idea of a self which prevents us from
understanding that our true nature is like the transitory sea foam of existence. Our
‘human nature’ only begins to differ from our Buddha nature when we assume that it is
natural for one to understand oneself as a self. And finally, he who has successfully
cleared away the dust of delusion from himself becomes like a perfectly polished mirror,
with nothing to show except for what arises in the world around him.
Another way to formulate this idea is such: Belief in the concept of the self
causes suffering. Unfortunately, although conceptual constructions like these may help
to define our goal—the casting off of the belief in the self—this is a much more difficult
thing to actualize and attain in daily practice. Our building blocks have formed a neat
tower, and we have climbed to the top and gazed at the horizon, but they have toppled,
and here we are again, over our heads in the hedgerow. Buddha describes his teachings
as a raft to ford the river of suffering in order to reach the far off bank of enlightenment:
as one does not take the raft after crossing the river, so we must not lean on his
teachings to make our way through life. So I intend here to abandon the raft for other
accounts of existence written by other thinkers, and in this my purpose is twofold: First,
in reading other interpretations we can gain new tools with which to study the
architecture of the concept of the self, and second, in studying the history of the
concept of self as it progresses through history we can better understand the noninherentness of this problematic construct.
Let me elaborate on my understanding of conceptions. Humans are tool users,
we understand things foremost in their utility, in their ability to be leveraged as a tool.
One of our tools is our brain, which subsumes difference into a comprehensible
sameness; we observe the world and form abstractions about it, concepts which we can
use in our daily lives. We find a berry bush, and are not so much concerned about the
individual bush or berry, but more importantly, that we can abstract all berry bushes
into a manageable sameness, creating the concept that berry bushes can be utilized as a
food source. Language allows for the creation of these symbolic, incorporeal tools,
allowing us to disseminate them, receive them, and infer new structures from those
already present.
These concepts hold no value beyond their inherent utility as a concept, yet we
often do not treat them as such. The concept that all berry bushes have berries which
are good to eat has value only to the extent that the conceptualizer recognizes the
bareness of the statement, the baselessness of the concept beyond its raw utility.
Without this precaution, our ability to conceptualize becomes a hindrance in living
without delusion, as our minds generate these concepts incessantly they become
addictive, alluring. In the face of unanswered questions, our berry picking

8

conceptualizer adds new concepts on top of his original concepts. Since the berries are
edible by us, they must be made with us in mind, meaning that in this field of bushes,
we hold a privileged position, separate from the other animals. Furthermore, it seems
unlikely that a plant which feeds us grew randomly, which implies that a more powerful
being created these plants for us to eat. When a drought wipes out the berry bushes,
our conceptualizer’s undue attachment to his conceptions beyond their inherent utility
may cause him to act in ways unfitting for the simple concept he began with—perhaps
he will feel that he has no recourse but to offer sacrifices upon the altar of his berrycreating God, and wonder what sins he committed which caused him to lose the berries
which had been gifted to him. This is an unskillful application of concepts.
As absurd as the fable may sound, we find ourselves committing the fallacy of
concept-worship daily. We have forgotten the baselessness-beyond-utility of concepts
such as capitalism, citizenship, morality, religion, and race, and instead of calling up
these tools only when the need arises, we instead allow them to distort our
understanding of the world, encumbering and preceding our thought about new
phenomena—they are dust on what is potentially a perfect mirror, hindering our actions
and thought from accurately reflecting the state of being around us. When modern man
encounters the berry bush, he cannot even see the berries, cannot even begin to form
an authentic conception of it, for his perceptions are already laden with the baggage of
over-conceptualization—whose berries are they, do they fit into my diet, why did God
create them, could I make money from this? Although concepts are generated in order
to better utilize the world, we find that the unskillful mind allows concepts to shape and
govern the world before we have even encountered what is there.
It is against such enslaving concepts that I employ my prayer of ignorance, in an
attempt to un-train such pre-emptive conceptualizing tendencies, recognizing the
subjective and baseless nature of the concepts I have engendered throughout the day,
seeing the building blocks in the towers I build as such, and allowing them to tumble to
the floor. And here I attempt to let fall the most adhesive of all concepts, the pin which
holds suffering to my lapel, the great distorter, the idea that I am a self.
It is the night of the New Year celebrations in China, and I am sitting in a dorm
room in the middle of Beijing as fireworks detonate throughout the entire city. Catching
me in the act of retiring to meditate, a few friends, some new and one old, ask if they
can join me, and I comply, of course, for I really enjoy telling other people about
Buddhism. It is like telling someone they have something in their teeth, except it has
been there for their entire lives, and has always been bothering them, and although I
cannot begin to tell them how to get it out, I am at least able to tell them, excuse me,
there may be something in your teeth. At the end of our makeshift meditation session, a
new friend asks: “What is the purpose of meditation?” To which my old friend responds,
“Well, I don’t know much about it, but I believe it has something to do with being
incredibly, incredibly confident in yourself.” At the time, this statement created great
discord within me, because although it felt correct, in that after meditation I often felt a
confidence or ease of demeanor, it seemed conceptually incorrect, that in a practice
which emphasized deference and denial of self the end result would be confidence, a
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disposition I associate with a violent conceptualizing of the world around oneself to
operate on the terms the subject feels comfortable with, and no others.
Now, almost a year later, my designation of the concept of self as the locus of
unskillful being sheds light onto the peculiar phenomenon of self confidence after
meditation. I believe what we actually experience here is a no-self confidence, in which
the absence of our generally omnipresent self-awareness causes a feeling of confidence.
When one generally operates with a concept of the self, one must constantly cross
reference one’s conception of the self with the situation arising. Is that something I
would say? Should I know the answer to this? I’m the sort of person who would like a
thing like this. I believe that the cessation of ourselves trying to act like our conceptions
of ourselves causes us to feel as if a self-doubt had been lifted, when in fact it is the
presence of the concept of a self which inhibits us and prevents us from arising with the
world, causing us to distort what we truly are, and as a consequence, that which the
world truly is.
And now I have raised the most loaded question of all: what are we truly? To say
that we are naturally, inherently much of anything is wishful, either a romanticization of
the mammals we are, or a fallacy of cause and effect. To speak of humans in terms of
their potential for good and evil is to have applied value judgments too early—we can
speak of good and evil but we will never find a basis for them beyond subjective
conceptualization of the world. Humans are, if fundamentally anything, fundamentally
tool users, conceptualizing and adapting, inhabiting the world we encounter. It is only
after placing man in a society which teaches good and evil that he will know of such
things. Raise a human child with a wolf, and he will howl, eat raw meat, and participate
in the pack hierarchy. Raise him with a chicken, and he will scratch at the ground and
become a part of the pecking order. Raise him with a human, and he will speak, and eat
from a dish, and wonder at what is good, and what is evil.
So we must understand that morality is, as all things, simply another conceptual
tool, allowing cultures to form and exercise power over the behavior of its members.
Indeed, once we have circumscribed all learned things as a part of a cultural inheritance,
a collection of conceptual building blocks transmitted from generation to generation,
without external value, we can understand culture itself as a tool, and investigate the
usefulness of the way of life which was passed down to us. From here we can determine
what should be cast aside, and what should be practiced. We can begin to culture
ourselves, to condition and practice a daily lifestyle which understands and is not slave
to the conceptual building blocks we carry through life.
In terms of nature, then, we have little in the way of predispositions—we are
beasts raised into an arbitrary definition of civility, which then allows us to act in a civil
manner. We cannot be said to be innately civil, or good, or anything, if all this means is
that we can adopt to civility, or being good. If this is the definition of an innate trait,
then we are simply innately anything we can adapt to, which is a convoluted way of
saying we are innately nothing but adapters. As far as organisms go, we are nothing
special, except for a distinct faculty to conceptualize, which we have so far—with the
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exception of a few gigantic, golden individuals—allowed to control us in ways which we
did not intend upon the creation of such conceptualizations.
Recognizing the baselessness of one’s current conceptions is one thing, but restructuring our own blocks is another task entirely. We must see that we are adrift,
alone in a dark sea, with a multitude of blocks with which to build our structures, but
with the new understanding that all of these blocks are empty of inherent value, wireframe constructions which have utility but no truthfulness beyond this utility. We must
move forwards with ‘no-self confidence,’ a recognition of the arbitrariness of our
concepts which creates a lightness in our mental step, an unwillingness to grant a
concept anything beyond its limited usefulness. As we approach the practical domain,
we encounter a tension between the mirroring no-self who finds parity between all
truth and the conceptualizing tool user projecting his dominant structures upon the
world. When do we watch? When do we act? And on what grounds do we do either?

11

Chapter 1: The Construction of the European Self

Section 1.1: The Purpose of This Conceptual Structure

The goal of this chapter is to trace the origins of the western notion of the self as
it evolves in the European tradition, through the philosophies of Plato, Augustine, and
René Descartes. The objective here is not an exhaustive timeline from the beginning to
the present, but merely an inspection of some of the earliest and most influential
thinkers, in order to gain an understanding of the general structure of the western
notion of self in its early stages, which may give insight as to the nature of our modern
western conception of self.
For all three thinkers, I will attempt to show that their philosophies lead them
into a general structure, a structure which will transform through time, and from one
thinker to the next, yet still remains a plausible and relevant way of understanding even
today’s western understanding of the self. The structure is laid out as follows: First, the
thinker begins with a prioritization of the rational aspect of the self, and of thought in
general. This leads to a privileging of language and discourse as the medium of reason.
Having established the primacy of reason, the thinker moves on to posit a conceptual
structure which utilizes reason to gain access to a higher truth about the world. The
presence of a higher order to the world allows the subject to posit that the self also
follows a higher order, a rational element which is dominant and makes the self a
coherent whole, a unity of intention. This prioritization of the rational aspect of the self
and the unity it implies causes the thinker to prioritize his own self’s understanding as
having access to the true nature of the world. This in turn causes the self to project
these values on the world, raising certain aspects as higher or good and simultaneously
designating other aspects as lower or negative, as is the nature of such binary
judgments. Finally, this has led to the development of the concept of will as a
fundamental quality of the self—as the self has access to a higher truth, it can therefore
go into the world to shape it as that higher truth dictates, backed by the confidence that
the dominant and rational element of the self has left nothing out in its formulation of
what is best for the world.
The transition of the notion of self over time, as traced in the three thinkers, is a
function of this self’s agency in the world, the evolution of the idea of the will and the
meaning this notion has both for how it is we know anything, and what it is we are
supposed to do. When we end with Descartes, we will see that the will becomes the
definitive element of the self, a positive force which gives us unlimited freedom of
choice and becomes the basis of our actions. However, for Augustine the will was a
negative element, a freedom of choice which tempts us from God’s grace. Prior to
Augustine, the notion of a freely determining will in Plato’s thought is non-existent—the
subject for the Greeks played no part in the acquisition of knowledge or the
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determination of the just life. The western self, with a fully-developed notion of free will,
becomes a participant in its own perception of the world, and is itself the basis for
action.
Another way of understanding this transition is by viewing it as a waning of the
power of reason as the power of the will rises. For Plato, reason dominates all other
faculties of the self, and to know reason is to love it, and to be against reason is simply
to be ignorant of it. The notion of a faculty which could move against the reasonable
faculty had not even been formed. For Augustine, reason is still paramount, although it
is challenged by a new faculty Augustine develops, the will. At this point, a theistic
reason dominates the will and directs it. Finally, in Descartes’ philosophy reason is
limited while the will is limitless, God-like, able to deny even those things which we
know to be true, and likewise to affirm those things which reason tells us we should not.
What I am attempting to prove here is that this is an understanding of the self
which has been built over time, not as a fundamental quality of human progress but
merely as the production of culture peculiar to Europe in this time period. This is not to
say that this is the only way Europeans are able to conceptualize themselves, for there
are certainly counter-currents and alternative traditions, but rather that this has been
the primary, dominant manner of understanding the self. Because of this privileged
position, the will-driven European self is almost always present in any discussion
concerning the self in European Philosophy, even if it is only overtly present as the
standard against which all other traditions must be measured.
Ultimately, I hope to show that this mode of understanding the self is not
intrinsic or necessary to any given human’s self conception, but rather it is merely a
culturally transmitted understanding of what it means to be a self, and therefore, in
terms of utility and understanding our manner of being in the world, it is not necessarily
deserving of the prioritization it has received. Furthermore, we can understand the
prioritization of the will and the positing of a conceptual structure that privileges
rationality as serving ultimately as a means of creating power for the self—they create a
system of justification which places the faculties of reason and will in the roles of
permitter and permitted—and I would like to prove that there is no way to justify,
rationally at least, this permission to act which the conceptual structure bestows upon
the will without already accepting the structure to begin with. The subject must agree
with the premises of the structure in order for the structure to convince that it is correct,
because the structure follows a circular logic. A skeptic approaching the structure from
the exterior has no good reason to accept in it, and it is only by making a ‘leap of faith’
in order to enter the cyclical argument that we can find it convincing. In the end, we
must see the will and reason as capacities of the self, and not dominating aspects which
produce imperatives to follow a certain conceptual structure, as the three European
philosophers at hand would like to argue.
Once this has all been established, (although a leap of faith may be required to
convince the reader of the validity of my own conceptual structure), I hope to be able to
show that any coherent philosophy, even one that aims at tearing down other coherent
philosophies, proposes and aims at something ‘higher,’ an ideal which should be sought
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more than any other. When we see that these structures cannot stand on their own, as
they are based in a system of binary valuations which cannot hold without the other, it
then follows that the structure of the self itself cannot hold. Therefore, rather than
holding one mode of being or conceptual structure as higher than any other, we must
attempt to foster a self which is an amalgamation of all these functions simultaneously,
as tools for various tasks rather than as doctrines of which there can be only one.
Therefore the self is most effective and least contradictory when we do not attempt to
posit a coherent synthesis of our self, but instead allow it to “contain multitudes,” as
Walt Whitman writes.
But for this chapter, it will be enough if I can show that the western notion of self
prioritizes reason, which allows the thinkers to believe they can create a conceptual
structure which has access to a higher truth, which creates an epistemology which gives
permission for the self to be a rational unity, and flex its will in a justified shaping of the
world.

Section 1.2: Plato and the Idea of the Good

Plato’s philosophy in many ways epitomizes the rational, conceptual structure
producing manner of thought which is the precursor of so much of European philosophy.
He makes no initial argument for the claim that reason is primary of all the aspects of
the self, but instead takes it as a truth of the natural world. Here I must note that
Charles Taylor has made an extensive analysis of the evolution of the European
conception of the self, and I rely on him for much of my understanding of this process.
So I begin with his description of Plato’s analogy of the healthy soul and the healthy
body, as he writes, “The soul by its nature needs or tends towards a certain kind of
order, one where reason is paramount, just like the body needs and tends towards the
order we identify as health.”2 So we see that for Plato, proving the primacy of reason is
not a matter of proving its value or worth, but rather simply a matter of stating the
obvious. As Plato writes, “Now, it pertains to reflection to rule, because it is wise and
exercises forethought in behalf of the whole soul; and to the spirited form to be its
servant and ally.”3
If for Plato reason is highest, it is understandable that his next move will be to
posit a conceptual structure which claims at a higher truth through reasoning. This is his
understanding of the forms, general idealizations of the world through which particular
things are informed through participation with the form. The forms are ultimately
discovered by gaining knowledge of the highest form, the idea of the Good. So Plato
ends his famous cave analogy, “In the intelligible place, the Idea of the Good is seen
2

Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1989. 121.
3
Plato, The Republic. Trans. R. E. Allen. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006. 141.
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finally and with difficulty, but once seen, it must be inferred that it is the cause of all
things right and beautiful.”4 To Plato, it is only through seeing the idea of the Good that
we can know the Good. It is only through assuming that an entity such as the idea of the
Good exists that we can believe in the idea of the Good. For Plato, his formulation of
reason as higher has caused him to believe that the world itself must have an element
of reason which is higher than everything else, thereby ordering the world. Already
caught up in imagining a hierarchy, he must posit some ideal to be higher than all other
ideals, which he has then named the idea of the Good.
Although for Plato the idea of the hierarchy of forms and the placement of the
idea of the Good at its pinnacle seems acceptable and even natural, for those on the
exterior it seems difficult to believe that such things exist. Plato’s reasoning is circular:
according to reason, and what is natural, all those below the philosopher-kings—those
who should naturally rule by reason—should naturally be subservient to them. These
philosopher-kings should rule because they use reason to gain access to an
understanding of what is best. Nowhere is there a case for reason itself to be primary,
beyond the weak claim that it is what is natural. As Taylor puts it, “One feature of this
natural order is the requirement itself that reason should rule; and so there is a selfaffirming aspect of reason’s hegemony.”5 Here we can see the ‘leap of faith’ required to
get on board with Plato: the conclusion (the Good exists) is also his premise (we can see
the Good). It is only by believing in reason as primary that the argument for believing in
reason as primary holds weight.
Having granted reason higher status, the wheels of Plato’s logic have produced a
conceptual structure which claims to give him access to a higher truth, which includes
the argument that a philosopher-king should rule over the warrior and laboring classes
as one with sole access to the higher truth (which seems to have belief in it as a
prerequisite to being believed). Backed by this conceptual structure, Plato can begin to
postulate an understanding of the self as a coherent whole. Taylor describes the move
from conceptual structure to self structure: “So reason can be understood as the
perception of the natural or right order, and to be ruled by reason is to be ruled by a
vision of this order.”6
Plato’s understanding of the self consists of three parts—reason, spirit, and
desires. For Plato it is the case that a just self consists in the reason controlling and
ruling the spirit and desires. He explains this by recourse to his model of the ideal city, in
which the ruling class is reasonable and has access to the idea of the Good, allowing
them to correctly guide the warrior and laboring classes. In this model, the warrior and
labor classes understand the ruling class’s right to rule, and submits to them willingly. So
too should the self be ordered, such that the spirit, which drives us with emotion, and
the desires, which hunger after various things, willingly be ruled by reason. So Plato
rhetorically asks, “. . . as there were three kinds contained in the city, money makers,
4

Plato 231.
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6
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5
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auxiliaries, and advisers, is there thus also this third kind in a soul, the spirited form, by
nature an auxiliary to reflection if it is not corrupted by bad upbringing?”7
The prioritization of the rational element of the self tips the balance of value
away from the other two elements, because valuing the rational implicitly devalues the
spirit and desires. Taylor describes a helpful view of Plato’s choice, which I will attempt
to paraphrase here. Being a self can be described as having various mental states, which
could be divided into Plato’s three categories: sometimes our minds are wrapped up in
grasping desperately for something we want, in lust, or greed; sometimes we are driven
by spirited emotions, outrage at an injustice or pride in an accomplishment; and then
some other times we are wrapped up in reflection, thinking about this or that, or even
one of the other mental states. At the least, these are all various manners in which the
average person exists in the world. If we view one of them as the norm, then the other
two will be exceptions to what is otherwise standard. Plato argues that because reason
can think of spirit and desires, it must necessarily be prior to them, so the other two
become slips, moments in which we are not correctly our selves. As Taylor writes,
For a moralist of reason, the privileged condition is not a special state in the
sense of being out of communication with all the others, but is on the contrary
the one in which all thoughts and feelings are under purview, as we achieve the
centering on ourselves that rational hegemony brings. Special, noncommunicating states are thus lapses; they are obstacles to reason and
represent failure to achieve the heights of reason.8

For my argument, what is at stake here is that Plato has divided the self in all its
various manners of being into three categories, and, through recourse to a conceptual
structure which cannot stand without recourse to circular reasoning, chosen to prioritize
one such faculty over the other. What follows is that Plato believes himself to be in
charge of his self: he is a unified, coherent whole which knows what is best for the world
and acts accordingly. So Plato declares, “The just man does not allow any element in
himself to do what properly belongs to another, or the kinds in his soul to meddle and
interfere with each other. . . he binds them all together and becomes, from many,
completely one.”9 For Plato, his justification for action, and for declaring himself a
unified self, does not come from within, but rather through recourse to a structure
which he finds beyond himself, in society or the cosmos. Plato’s whole basis for action
rests on his recourse to a conceptual structure outside of his own intentions, yet this
structure was created by him and is only convincingly viable if one already finds it
convincingly viable.
Finally, Plato’s understanding of himself as a coherent whole allows him to go
into the world confident in his own epistemology, his actions given validity and justice
by a structuring of the world which he himself has created. This causes him to raise the
just life, as outlined by the idea of the Good, as the correct course of action regardless
of whether the illusory world of sense experience might suggest otherwise. As Taylor
7
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describes, “and this is just the doctrine that the Republic is meant to establish, that the
just life is the most advantageous—even in the absence of success in the world of action
and power.”10
Having run through Plato’s argument in the form I have outlined in the first
section, we can now rehash where Plato seems to be coming from. In prioritizing reason,
he generates a conceptual structure which is based not upon the things we experience
but upon the need to posit a higher order engendered by the prioritization of reason as
something higher. From this creation of the idea of the Good, Plato declares that the
self is unified in perceiving this highest order, and from here is able to produce a
justification for going into the world as he sees fit—namely, dividing up the people he
sees as beneath him into categories which should intrinsically be willingly to submit to
people of his class, who happen to be the ones who would rule in a just society. Already,
we can see the general form of the western self taking shape—one who believes they
are a coherent whole, who appeals to the power of rationality to produce a conceptual
structure which justifies the actions they take. However, for Plato there is not yet a
recognized element of choice—to truly know the Good is to love it, and to love it is to
act it out. Wrongful acts cannot be performed in spite of the Good, but only in ignorance
of it. It is not until Augustine that the faculty of the western self to assert its will upon
the world emerges.

Section 1.3: Augustine and God

Saint Augustine represents an important step from the Greek to the modern
western conception of the self, as he carries the Greek’s value of rationality and method
into the Christian task of understanding our relationship to God. Plato’s influence is
recognizable in Augustine’s proof of God’s existence. Augustine believes that we can
create a hierarchical structure based upon the notion that higher things must include
the lower within them. This allows him, like Plato, to place reason as highest—because
reason considers everything, nothing could be higher.
As there are everyday objects in the world, Augustine believes there are also
higher everyday objects, such as number or wisdom. He finds these truths to be selfevident, such that we do not question their validity, but rather use them as a measure
of our own understanding of truth. Finally, in understanding that such higher things
exist, we can conclude that there is God as well. Augustine’s God and Plato’s Good have
many things in common: they are both higher ordering principles which give form to the
world; for both to truly know them is to love them; and for both it is the sensory world
which distracts us from reaching the higher truth.

10
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However, Augustine makes a critical break from Plato in his formulation of how
we discover the transcendent. While for Plato the Good is discovered in studying the
myriad forms of the external world, for Augustine God is discovered by turning within,
to examine the nature of the soul. In Augustine’s own words, “We reach him, in truth,
not when we become altogether what he is, but rather when we become nearest to him,
touching him in a marvelous and intelligible way, inwardly illumined and seized by his
truth and holiness.”11 Although Augustine posits the inner as the site of discovering the
transcendent, his structure is otherwise very similar to Plato’s—he prioritizes reason as
that which encompasses other things, and is then driven to carry this claim out to the
fullest extent: there must be a thing which encompasses all things, God.
This distinction between the avenues to higher truth—the move from accessing
it in the outer to accessing it from within—carries greater implications than are first
visible. Firstly, this means that the subject becomes critical in understanding the truth.
Whereas for Plato finding the truth was a matter of turning our attention to the correct
objects of the world, for Augustine the truth can only be found within. Albrecht Dihle
writes extensively on the theory of will as it develops in Augustine’s time. Dihle
observed that Augustine’s inward turn is also the first in western philosophy’s history to
attempt to turn the understanding upon understanding itself, to try to comprehend the
way the subject encounters the phenomenon of the world. So Dihle writes, “St.
Augustine. . . concentrated on the problem of what is going on in the human mind
during the act of cognition.”12
It is further the case for Augustine that the subject played a larger role in things
than simply being the access to truth. Plato’s conceptual structure was supposedly so
transcendent and so inherently Good that to know it was immediately to love it, and
consequently the only way one could possibly go against the Good was simply by being
ignorant of it. However, for Augustine, we must not only know God but agree to follow
his will. As Augustine writes, “Not all, therefore, will to live blessedly, indeed few will
this, if there is no way to live blessedly except by living in accord with excellence of soul,
which many do not will.”13
Augustine sees this faculty for assent as the will, the ability to determine our
own actions despite knowledge of the order of the world. Etienne Gilson writes,
“everything depends on the decision man will or will not make to allow the order he
sees imposed by God on nature to reign within himself.”14 For Augustine, the will is a
fundamental aspect of man. In his analysis, he finds that even the senses and our search
for knowledge are directed by the will. This is because the will directs the attention of
our sense organs, such that without the presence of the will to perceive, the sense
organs may as well not be perceiving at all, and inversely, when the will is strong, the
11
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perceptions grow in importance and feeling.15 Equally, the will determines our
attainment of knowledge, directing our interests. As Gilson writes, “but whatever the
degree of knowledge we attain, it is always determined by an impulse to investigate
which has its origins in the will.”16
The positing of the will as participating in perception is another important break
from earlier traditions. While thinkers like Plato believed perception was simply a
matter of ideas correlating to real forms, a process independent from the subject, for
Augustine perception is complicated and shaped by the subject himself. As Albrecht
Dihle writes, “intellectual activity would be impossible without the potential of objects
of cognition offered by the memory, without the faculty of reasoning, and without the
moving force of will.”17
Not only is the will powerful in guiding the man, but, because of this faculty for
control, also incredibly dangerous without proper checks. The direction of the will is the
determining factor in man’s choice of right and wrong, and whether or not it is
conditioned with the understanding of God is the difference between good and evil. This
view is represented in Augustine’s biblical interpretations, as it is the difference in will
which differentiates the fallen angels from the good. As Dihle describes, “the will of the
fallen angels has been perverted by their attempt to be and to act independently of
their Creator, whereas the good angels never changed the direction of their will.” 18
Satan transmits this freedom of will to Adam in the garden, which Augustine sees as the
root of our tendencies towards evil. Again in Dihle’s words, “the will of man has been
transformed, in consequence of the fall of Adam, from love in concupiscence, i.e. selfcenteredness, from humilitas into superbia.”19
Taylor describes this action of the will against God’s guidance as a ‘perversity,’
causing us to act contrary to our insight. As he writes, “this perversity can be described
as a drive to make ourselves the centre of our world, to relate everything to ourselves,
to dominate and possess the things around us.”20 In other words, without the guidance
of the conceptual structure of the goodness of God, Augustine sees that the will drives
us to understand the world in terms of its use for us, finding nothing but means to
better realize what we desire. Augustine describes the will’s turn away from God,
For in that more excellent nature which is God, it sees certain intrinsically
beautiful things. And, although it ought to stand fast to enjoy them, it wills to
assign those things to itself and wills not to be like God by God’s doing but by its
own doing to be what God is. Thus the soul is turned from God, set in motion,
and slips into less and less, which it supposes to be more and more. For it is not
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sufficient for itself, nor is anything sufficient for one who withdraws from him
who alone suffices.21

The end of this paragraph highlights what for Augustine is the solution to the
misguidance of the will—to return to an understanding that although the will might
move the soul, God is prior to the soul and necessary for its being. Taylor formulates the
danger of the unchecked will as the consequence of the reflexive turn closing on itself,
that in looking inwards to find reason, we do not find God but only our own volitions.
The antidote, then, is to acknowledge that we are not the source of our soul, that there
is something prior to and transcendent above our self understanding. In Taylor’s words,
“evil is when reflexivity is enclosed on itself. Healing comes when it is broken open, not
in order to be abandoned, but in order to acknowledge its dependence on God.”22 What
is important is that we do not place undue confidence in our will, but instead are
constantly humbled in our recollection of God’s primacy. As Dihle frames it, “this belief
is the background of St. Augustine’s famous paradox that sin or vice combined with
humility are far better than virtue together with pride. Accordingly, humility is the root
of all virtues, as is pride of all vices.”23
Once again, we find in Augustine as in Plato the basic order which I outlined in
the first section. A positing of the rational as something higher causes the belief that
there must be something ultimately highest, a conceptual structure which in turn allows
Augustine to see himself as a coherent unity, ordered by God and driven by the will. The
will, however, becomes a troublesome concept indeed. The idea that we can know the
transcendent and yet choose not to adhere to it, that we could, like Milton’s Satan,
decide it is better to rule in Hell than serve in Heaven, raises obvious questions. Our will,
even in these early stages, drives how we perceive the world, shapes our search for
truth, and if left unchecked, causes us to be self-centered, manipulative creatures. René
Descartes will further complicate things by positing that the presence of the will is also
the source of error. What is the western self then left with if it should choose to
abandon the conceptual structure which checks this faculty of will, if, as we may
discover in later chapters, God is dead—is it possible to create our own conceptual
structures to regulate our will, if the will controls us so fundamentally as to effect our
very sense perceptions and search for knowledge?

Section 1.4: Descartes and Himself

As Augustine turned the search for a higher ideal from the Good of the exterior
world to the God of the inner soul, Descartes will take this move a step further by
positing that truth can only be constructed through the subject. Descartes continues to
21
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uphold reason as one of the fundamental ordering properties of man, as he writes,
“There is only one soul in man, the rational soul; for no actions can be reckoned human
unless they depend on reason.”24 Therefore method is paramount—we must follow
reason in constructing a series of inferences which we build towards the truth. So he
begins with his famous line, “I think, therefore I am,” a statement which he believes
cannot be refuted, for in order for the phrase to be issued the speaker must exist, must
be exerting its will. As Descartes explains, “. . .remarking that this truth ‘I think,
therefore I am’ was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions
brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion
that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I
was seeking.”25
Through rational analysis Descartes has determined that his ego is at least
existent, and furthermore has shown his prioritization of reason as the means to
attaining truth. Descartes then follows in the footsteps of Plato and Augustine,
compelled to posit a higher order because he believes that things must fall into a
hierarchy, and that therefore there must be something at the top. So he generates a
proof of God’s existence, arguing that for him to have the understanding that he is a less
than perfect being requires that there must be a more perfect being than him in order
for this notion to exist. In his words, “In this way it could but follow that it had been
placed in me by a Nature which was really more perfect than mine could be, and which
even had within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea – that is to say,
to put it in a word, which was God.”26
Although similar to Plato and Augustine in his need to posit a hierarchy due to
his prioritization of reason, Descartes’ epistemology is much closer to the modern view
held today. In Plato’s understanding, the faculties of perception correspond to the
object being perceived, so the faculty of knowledge is highest because it can grasp the
forms, while the senses are lower because they can only grasp the changing world of
phenomena. Despite this devaluing of the senses, for Plato it is still the case that the
senses cannot deceive, for it is not that the senses are faulty but simply that they
perceive something changing and ephemeral. Descartes, however, believes the senses
can indeed be wrong, for they are inherently limited. Descartes’ move in stating that the
only truth which can initially be relied upon is his existence as a thinking thing leads him
to discount the entire world of sense experience and the precedent of what he has
learned, for even the existence of his body is under question. So, while for Plato the
Good was out there in the world, and for Augustine God is equally ‘out there,’ even if
discoverable initially only through the innerness of the soul, for Descartes the ‘out there’
bears no relation to his process of discovering the truth. In the thought of Plato and
Augustine the ‘out there’ held the answers to questions such as the meaning of life and
the nature of truth, but for Descartes the ‘out there’ is merely a giant mechanical clock,
simply continuing with whatever actions are set upon it, holding no more truth than
24
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that which we can generate for ourselves. As Taylor describes this distinction, “we
demystify the cosmos as a setter of ends by grasping it mechanistically and functionally
as a domain of possible means.”27
Therefore, we are no longer putting together the pieces of an order already in
the world, like Plato’s Good or Augustine’s God, but rather generating our own order
based upon our own findings. In Taylor’s words, “a representation of reality now has to
be constructed. . . . so the order of ideas ceases to be something we find and becomes
something we build.”28 Descartes, then, in terms of the conceptual structure I am
attempting to put together, has done what his predecessors did not, he has recognized
the nature of his ideals as put together by the subject himself. The consequence of this
shift is that we are no longer willful, reasoning beings governed and shaped by an order
already eminent in the world, but rather we are willful, reasoning beings governing,
shaping and applying order to a world where no such things are present.
This being is still governed by reason, but it is a reason which constructs truth
instead of discovering it. In Descartes’ philosophy, self-mastery is to subsume ourselves
once again under the hegemony of reason. As for Plato, for Descartes the desires and
passions are subservient to the domination of reason. However, this is not due to their
natural tendencies, but rather to the all-encompassing power which Descartes believes
thought possesses.
Equally important for Descartes is the faculty of will. While for Augustine it
represented a dangerous divide between faith and sin, for Descartes the will is
important for just this reason. As Descartes writes, “Now freewill is in itself the noblest
thing we can have because it makes us in a certain manner equal to God and exempts us
from being his subjects; and so its rightful use is the greatest of all the goods we possess,
and further there is nothing that is more our own or that matters more to us.” 29
For Descartes the powers of reason and will no longer take their direction from
something higher, instead it is the subject himself which drives his own actions. This can
be seen in his use of the proof of God’s existence—although it is an important step,
Descartes’ positing of the existence of God is one step in a logical progression which
aims at something beyond simply conceptualizing the transcendent. God is no longer
the foundation of our existence, as He was for Augustine, but is now simply another
step in Descartes’ rational proof of the superiority of the will.30 By restructuring the
sequence of authority, from the subject being shaped by the higher to the subject
shaping the higher, Descartes has given the western self a new sense of agency.
In the absence of the orders imposed by the transcendent structures of his
predecessors, for Descartes the impetus for action is this self-sufficiency itself. Taylor
elaborates, “If rational control is a matter of mind dominating a disenchanted world of
matter, then the sense of the superiority of the good life, and the inspiration to attain it,
27
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must come from the agent’s sense of his own dignity as a rational being.”31 This brings
the will to the forefront of the self’s activity, and for Descartes it is of central importance
in the just life.
Descartes has also taken another great step towards the modern notion of the
self. By beginning in absolute skepticism, Descartes has touched upon the idea that
rationality is still subjective, that it reveals not an objective world but more tellingly the
subjective world of the perceiver. Although the faculties of reason and will have given
the subject a new level of agency, Descartes also argues that these freedoms bring with
them the potential for error, because our knowledge is limited while our will remains
unlimited. As Descartes writes, “since the will is much wider in its range and compass
than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also
to things which I do not understand; and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it
easily falls into error and sin. . .”32
In this way, although our will is unlimited, we must restrain it with what
understanding we have or it will lead us into error. Descartes believes that when we
restrain our will in this way, it cannot lead us astray. As he puts it, when he exercises this
sort of restraint he cannot be deceived, “for every clear and distinct conception is
without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought, but
must of necessity have God as its author – God, I say, who being supremely perfect,
cannot be the cause of any error, and consequently we must conclude that such a
conception is true.”33
In the end, although Descartes finds the will to be paramount to the good life, he
is unwilling to free it from the binds Augustine laid out for it. As Descartes writes, “But,
as knowledge of the existence of God must not keep us from being assured of our free
will in that we experience it and feel it ourselves, so also the knowledge of our free will
must not make us doubt the existence of God.”34 Still for Descartes God is present, a
higher truth which tempers the freedom of the will.

Section 1.5: Conclusion

Plato’s elevation of the rational and Augustine’s development of the notion of
will allows Descartes to generate a structure in which free will not only exists, but is a
positive rather than a negative quality in man. If we can bracket criticism involving the
actual possibility of the existence of a transcendent and infinitely perfect being and its
subsequent influence on the works of philosophers throughout time, Descartes leaves
31
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us with a self which has in the will an unlimited potential to choose, and the justification
to pursue this choice through a knowledge which is itself created and shaped by the will.
Descartes describes the effects of such a self-conception:
In place of understanding the perfections which are truly in us, [man] attributes
to other creatures imperfections which they do not have and puts himself above
them, and so enters on an impertinent presumption: he wishes to be of the
council of God, and to take on with God the charge of running the world, which
causes an infinity of vain iniquities and falsehoods.35

I argue that Descartes’ structure generates an ideal—God, perfection, infallibility—then
attributes this quality to the faculty of the will. He postulates that as long as we are
mindful of our dependence upon God, and make certain to bound our will within the
limits of our understanding, that we cannot be deceived or do wrong unintentionally.
But of what nature are these checks? If the will shapes how we perceive
everything but the most basic observations, then it is tenuous to argue that we can ever
know when our understanding is insufficient enough to restrict the projection of will, if
the projection of will itself shapes our knowing. Descartes writes, “. . .understanding is
the passivity of the mind and willing is its activity. . .”36 When the will has the power to
shape even that which is meant to control it, then nothing controls it. This
understanding of the self creates something which has a great capacity to shape the
world to its ideals, subsuming all things, even understanding itself, as a means to its end.
In the following chapter, I will examine the Confucian understanding of the self
in an attempt to both understand what it is the Confucian model makes of the self, but
also in order to contrast the two conceptualizations, highlighting their differences as a
way to show the non-essential nature of either or any self-conception. For example,
Chinese thought was generally much less dualistic, so binaries such as body and soul,
sensible and rational, or reason and desire were never prominent in Eastern thought.
Next, Chapter 3 will return to the European self, using the thought of Nietzsche
and Derrida to deconstruct this problematic conceptual construction. I hope to reveal
this structure as based in the western self’s fundamental drive to accumulate influence,
material wealth, and control: the will to power. I begin with Nietzsche’s deconstruction
of the European self, which draws us into an analysis of culture’s power relationship
with the individual self. Next, Derrida will demonstrate a similar deconstruction, the end
goal of which is not to posit a new hierarchy, like Nietzsche, but rather to leave the
dominant tradition deconstructed.
Chapter 4 will attempt to apply a similar criticism to the Confucian self, this time
using the Daoist thinker Zhuangzi. His approach is based on the notion that all things are
becoming, in flux, and therefore language cannot have a fixed referent in the sensible
world. His critique of value judgments echoes the critiques presented by Derrida, in that
he argues for a relativity of meaning which negates any attempts to posit absolute
truths or higher ideals.
35
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Finally, I hope to show that, given the destabilized nature of such structures
which aim at the higher, we should instead posit that all of these manners of conceiving
the self have equal value—in other words, we should array the various manners of being
a self on the horizontal axis of value rather than on the vertical axis, because none are
more correct, as they are all equally plausible. Their value should actually be found not
through reference to the arguments laid out in the conceptual structures which support
them, for these are not necessarily objective arguments, as they are wrapped up in the
aims of the structure. Instead, we should approach them in their uses to us. As a self
driven by the will to power we have an incredible capacity to achieve abstract goals
using all the means at our disposal, while a Daoist model allows for an ability to
understand the world as it is, attempting to have no end to create means for.
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Chapter 2: The Construction of the Chinese Self

Section 2.1: The Purpose of This Conceptual Structure

The objective of this second chapter is to explore the construction of the self as
it appears in China, specifically in the tradition of Confucius and his modern
commentators. The analysis of the Chinese self will be comparative with the European
construction of the self outlined in the previous chapter, not because the European is
somehow prior to or more truthful than the Chinese construction, but simply because to
the European or American self, myself included, the European construction will seem
more familiar, while the Chinese will feel foreign. Again, like the European chapter, this
chapter on the Confucian construction of self will not be an exhaustive timeline from
the beginning of the Confucian tradition to the present, but merely an overview
stressing certain points which I find relevant in constructing my own analysis.
Despite China’s incredibly long history of what westerners call philosophy, and
despite the various efforts to purge ‘traditional values’ from the thought of the Chinese
people during the second half of the 20th century—even specifically targeting such
‘feudal values’ as Confucianism itself—I believe a study of Confucian thought can still
provide valuable insight into the workings of the Chinese self as it is constructed today.
This may be the case even when the Chinese themselves feel otherwise, as illustrated in
what I consider my first encounter with Confucian values.
While I was living in Harbin, China, almost exactly a year ago from the time of
this writing, I was joking around lewdly with my Chinese roommate, a young man from
inner Mongolia named Zhou Rui. Zhou had described his thought as entirely westernized,
with no traces of traditional Chinese or even Marxist values. To him, the biggest
difference between our worldviews was the way we brushed our teeth (He used a cup,
while I simply stuck my head under the faucet, to his great surprise). Yet here we were,
trading simple profanities to the best of my Mandarin language skills, when I said to him,
“I’m smelly? Zhou Rui, your mom is the smelly one!” He turned from his computer
screen to look at me with an uncharacteristically serious expression on his face. “Huang
(my family name), you absolutely should not say things like that about my mother.” He
stared at me for a moment longer, clearly shocked. “Do you understand what I mean?
You’re talking about my mother.” Of course, I apologized profusely and that was that. In
all of our joking around, I was for the first time seriously concerned I had hurt my good
friend’s feelings.
To me, this small exchange illustrates the pervasiveness of the culturally
transmitted constructions of self we inherit, the vast yet subtle differences between
them, and their roots in the earliest philosophies of our respective civilizations. In the
same way a European might believe there is a distinct separation between mind and
body while not consciously acknowledging that such a thought is informed by Descartes’
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philosophy, my friend Zhou Rui holds a deep reverence for his mother’s name and
societal respect without being conscious of Confucius’ influence upon his values.
This chapter continues from the introduction in the second section by arguing
that familial order is the basis of Confucian thought. This is expanded upon to show that
the Chinese self is inextricably social, meaning that each person’s self-definition is
intrinsically tied up with their inter-personal relationships, as father, son, or countryman.
Thinkers like Descartes, egoists who turn away from the world and into their own
consciousness to declare that they are certain only of themselves, are not present in
Chinese thought. Further, Confucian thought argues that the self is a process, a
narrative across time, not a conceptual unity which can be isolated and inspected
through systematic analysis.
The third section argues that for Confucius the cultivation of the self is achieved
through the reformation of our natural tendencies. This reformation is enacted through
ritual, societal traditions which provide the framework for the progress of the self. In
Confucian thought, ritual is the essential humanizing condition, what separates us from
animals. This opens the way to understanding the self as a focus-field, a point at the
center of a field which both defines and is defined by the field itself. As the family is the
fundamental focus-field structure, the father orders the family around him, ensuring
proper harmony between mother, sons, and daughters. When the father cultivates
himself, the family is in turn cultivated. Yet it is only through being within the field that
the focus has the opportunity to become cultivated, so it is equally true that the man is
cultivated by his position as father and husband.
In the fourth and final section of this chapter, I attempt to provide clear
distinctions between the European and Chinese constructions of self. First I will outline
the differences between the understanding of order evident within both traditions.
Then, I will show that, although the Chinese self is inextricably interdependent with
society, individual autonomy still exists and is considered important for properly
interfacing with ritual culture. That total immersion of the self in society and autonomy
of the self seem incompatible may speak more to the disposition of our European selves
than any fault in Chinese thought.
Next, I will attempt to contrast the concept of will so pervasive and problematic
in European thought to the Confucian equivalent. Although the idea of the faculty of will
is present in the Chinese construction of self, it lacks much of the conceptual
systematizing applied to the European self. Specifically, the Chinese will, represented by
the xin or heart-mind, is thinking, feeling, and judging—in other words, the Chinese will
makes no distinction between reason, spirit, and desire, as Plato’s tripartite soul does.
Further, for the Chinese there is no distinction between idea and action, meaning that
the will and willing are inseparable. While Descartes found the will to be dominant over
all other elements of the self because of its capacity to will beyond the realm of
possibility, for the Chinese there is little use for applying the will to what cannot actually
be accomplished.
Finally, the Chinese have no history of Cartesian dualism, Descartes’ pervasive
claim that the mind must exist, even if the body may not, thereby defining body and
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mind as independent entities. In the Chinese formulation, it is instead the case that even
the will is not entirely mental, as they believe that all elements of the interior self will
manifest in the exterior, not only through posture, dress, and action, but even in a sort
of aura of authority and civility which a particularly exemplary person might radiate
from their very being.

Section 2.2: The Confucian Self As Narrative and Inextricably Social

Confucius sees order in the world as constituents arrayed around an organizing
center—the cosmos around heaven, the barbarian tribes around the Middle Kingdom
(as China refers to itself), the state around the Emperor, the family around the father. In
Confucian thought, the family is the basis of all such fields of relationship, serving as the
basic unit of interdependence which provides the foundation for more expansive fields.
In the Analects of Confucius it is asked of Confucius, “Why are you not employed in
governing?” To which he replies, “It is all in filial conduct! Just being filial to your parents
and befriending your brothers is carrying out the work of government. In doing this I am
employed in governing. Why must I be ‘employed in governing’?”37 For Confucius, a
proper family structure is a prerequisite for further development, and the foundation of
society. So he claims that when he performs familial order, he is participating in the
correct functioning of the government. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, advocates of
the focus-field interpretation, argue that “Familial order is fundamental in determining
at least the Confucian sense of self. And the bureaucratic structure and the state itself
are extensions of familial order. The other fields by which the individual is
contextualized are continuous with the family model.”38
The Confucian emphasis on familial relations illustrates a key difference
between the European and Chinese manners of conceptualizing the world. Although it is
a broad generalization, there is value in stating that Europeans tend to conceptualize
things as independent of each other, while the Chinese view the world in a correlative
fashion, such that the definition of one particular thing depends upon the things it is
associated with. In practical terms, for the European when the relationship between
two things is removed, they simply remain the two things they were, as they were
already defined independently of each other. For the Chinese, however, when the
relationship between two things is removed, the definition of each thing is changed,
because their correlation was a definitive element of their definition.39
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This distinction between the European and Chinese modes of perception can be
detected in the child’s relationship to his or her parents. While in European or American
society, children begin to view themselves as independent of their parents at an early
age—leading to the rebellious character of youth western societies perceive as
natural—for the Chinese one’s relationship with one’s parents is generally highly
respectful and obedient. The European child defines themselves on their own terms,
excluding from their nascent self-conception their deep social and economic
dependence on their parents. On the other hand, the Chinese child’s self-conception is
interdependent with that of the parents. Tu Wei-Ming writes, “the Confucian approach
takes as its point of departure that the father-son relationship is absolutely binding. . . .
The trite and commonplace observation that one cannot choose one’s father is here
maintained as a core value.”40
For the Chinese, it is not the case that father, mother and son are placed in a
relationship which further informs their sense of selves, but rather that these
relationships serve as the starting point for the very creation of a sense of self—there is
no son without a father and mother, so there is no self without the other. Therefore we
can say that the Confucian self is inextricably social, with nothing considered prior. As
Mark A. Berkson argues, “there is not the sense that there is a ‘true self’ underneath all
of these roles that we ‘play,’ but rather that selfhood is manifested only in these
relational roles.”41 Hall and Ames compare the relationship of self and other to that of
yin and yang or day and night—one cannot be understood without the other, and
furthermore, one is constantly becoming the other, such that we cannot objectively
declare what is night and what is day, but only state relative truths, that day is becoming
night.42
As I have noted, this fundamental inclusion of the other in the conception of the
self means that the development of Chinese thought has occurred without the
European emphasis on the independent individual as the sole access to truth. While
Descartes strives to remove all external influences in an attempt to isolate what is
fundamental within him, Confucius turns to external influences to define his sense of
self, yet turns to them in a way which does not consider them external. For Confucius,
this distinction does not even represent a choice, for to the Chinese to be social is to be
human, such that what is in us prior to our participation in the traditions of culture is
merely animal. As Kwong-loi Shun writes, “the hypothetical figure of the egoist does not
play a role in Chinese ethical thought and Chinese thinkers see their audience as
concrete individuals who already share to some extent the concerns and perspectives
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shaped by the social order within which they have been brought up.”43 The subject’s
fundamental social involvement is illustrated in passage 5.12 of The Analects: “Zigong
said, ‘I do not want others to impose on me, nor do I want to impose on others.’
Confucius replied, ‘Zigong, this is quite beyond your reach.’”44
As the Confucian self is constructed based upon its relationships to others, so
selfhood is conceived of as an ongoing narrative rather than a specific element of the
self. When the self is a son, for example, it is constituted by its relationships with father
and mother, but when this individual creates his own family, his relationship to others
changes, and therefore his self itself must change. This change is often described as
cultivation, the gradual betterment of the self and thereby those intrinsically related to
you. As Tu describes, “The ultimate purpose of life is neither regulating the family nor
harmonizing the father-son relationship, but self-realization. Indeed, only through selfcultivation can one’s family be regulated and, by implication, one’s relationship to one’s
father harmonized.”45
This process of development over a lifetime is an important aspect of Confucian
selfhood. Selfhood here requires a temporal narrative, not merely a consciousness of
one’s life but an active effort towards cultivating the correct qualities. Confucius
describes the narrative transformation of his self over his life in The Analects, noting
each stage as an achievement: “From fifteen, my heart-and-mind (志 zhi) was set upon
learning; from thirty I took my stance; from forty I was no longer doubtful; from fifty I
realized the propensities of heaven; from sixty my ear was attuned; from seventy I could
give my heart-and-mind (心 xin) free rein without overstepping the boundaries.”46 The
two characters given here, 志 zhi, and 心 xin are the characters generally translated as
the will in the western sense, although 志 zhi is closer to disposition in meaning.
Although I will analyze the Chinese notion of will later, it is interesting to note that
Confucius does not give his will, or heart-mind (心 xin) ‘free rein’ until he is seventy.
In the Confucian tradition what is cultivated is one’s nature, which is generally
considered fundamentally good. Although we have a basically good nature, without
proper cultivation we are less than human, showing that a human divorced from society
and relying only on its nature is for Confucius merely an animal. Tu Wei-Ming comments
on our necessity for cultivation despite having good nature: “the intrinsic goodness in
our nature is often in a latent state: only through long and strenuous effort can it be
realized as an experienced reality.”47 For Confucius socialization is a betterment of our
nature, and it is only through participation in culture that we have the opportunity to
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become human at all. As Berkson writes, “While we are born with our nature, we come
into selfhood; it is fully realized only with our effort and over time. Everyone has a
nature; not everyone has a fully developed self.”48

Section 2.3: The Confucian Self within Ritual and the Focus-Field

In Confucian thought, it is ritual, 禮 li, which provides the framework for the
cultivation of the self. Ritual refers to the intricacies of social relations, from the
movements of court officials within Imperial buildings to the way we greet one another
on the street. Proper participation in ritual is the means by which the progress of selfcultivation is made. As Confucius states in The Analects, “One stands to be improved by
the enjoyment found in attuning oneself to the rhythms of ritual propriety (li 禮) and
music, by the enjoyment found in talking about what others do well, and by the
enjoyment found in having a circle of many friends of superior character.”49
Here we can see that for Confucius ritual is the link between the self and the
other, for in participating in ritual with others we cultivate ourselves, yet it is only
through the other that we can begin to be cultivated. In Confucian thought, ritual is not
a constriction added on top of general social interaction, but rather is itself the basis of
social interaction, and therefore self-cultivation. As Berkson writes, “Confucian thinkers
believe that the cultivation of the self through these activities, which are preserved and
transmitted through education and constitute the essence of the tradition, is the
essential humanizing activity.”50 Without cultivation there is no human, without the
other there is no cultivation, and without ritual there can be no other, meaning that
ritual is essential for achieving humanity in Confucian thought.
Ritual should not be viewed as a restriction on natural human life (although we
will encounter certain Daoists who do), but rather as that which allows us to be human.
Tu comments that the father-son relationship “is a constraint, a limitation, and bondage;
yet through its constraining, limiting, and binding power, it provides a necessary means
for self-cultivation for the father as well as the son.”51 In other words, we do not grow
more familiar with the other—and therefore our selves—despite the rigors of ritual, but
rather are able to grow precisely because such restrictions are in place. For Confucians,
the way, or 道 dao, the manner in which the world unfolds, is expressed through ritual
itself. Ritual is not a translation or set of rules applied to the experience of the way, but
is itself an unfolding of the way. As Berkson writes, “It is not that the authentic
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experience of the other (or of the dao itself) is somehow mediated by categories. Rather,
the dao manifests itself in just these ways, with these distinctions.”52
The objective of observing ritual in Confucian thought is ultimately the
achievement of harmony between the innate qualities of the person, 質 zhi, and the
cultural norms of the surrounding society, or form, 文 wen. As the Analects states,
“Achieving harmony (he 和) is the most valuable function of observing ritual propriety (li
禮).”53 These qualities, zhi, are the innate traits of the person, the particular
characteristics which define the individual. Form, wen, is the cultural schooling the
individual receives, inundating the person with the social etiquette and cues necessary
to participate in society.
While a European philosophical formulation of the relationship between
individual quality and cultural form would generally be of form dominating and
correcting what is lacking in quality, in the Confucian conception harmony between the
two is required for the successful cultivation of the self. As Confucius states, “When
quality (zhi) overwhelms form (wen), one is a rustic. When form overwhelms quality,
one is a pedant. Only when form and quality are combined is one an exemplary
person.”54 While cultivation of the self as human cannot be done without participation
in the social, the innate qualities of the self cannot be washed away with this
participation—harmony rather than control is essential in the proper realization of ritual.
My own teacher, Professor James Behuniak, relates the importance of harmony
between form and quality using the analogy of soup, an analogy ubiquitous within
classical Chinese discussions of harmony. He writes, “while the unique features of an
onion are rendered delicious in a well-harmonized soup, the strongest feelings and
desires of a person are rendered social and communicable in a well-harmonized
ritual. . . . Both soup and ritual promote the expression of a unique quality (zhi); both
give it outlet and render its expression palatable and aesthetically fitting.”55 While the
onion has its own unique qualities, it would be disgusting to eat it raw. Its participation
in the soup allows it to express the full quality of its taste while at the same time
allowing for its participation in the broader field of tastes. Without the overall form of
the soup, each ingredient would be inedible, yet if each ingredient did not have its own
unique quality, the soup would be tasteless. This is the crux of the Confucian conception
of order: recognizing the unique quality of each particular and bringing them together in
a harmonious form which exceeds the value of its individual constituents without at the
same time losing what is unique in each.
In the Confucian tradition, participation in ritual interaction advances the way of
the tradition and allows for self-cultivation. I have noted earlier that Confucians
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consider the self irreducibly social, thrown into an awareness of the other without a
state of being prior to this relationship. The implications of this social embeddedness is
farther reaching than simply being the prerequisite for formulating a self. The Confucian
self develops within the field of its relationships, cultivated by enacting the role of the
particular individual relative to the things which allows the particular to be the
particular which it is. When the self is properly cultivated in this way, it is not only the
self which is cultivated, but in turn the field of things around the self are cultivated as
well. As the father cultivates himself as a father, the family around him is also bettered
and allowed to enact their proper roles as well. This relationship is so irreducible that
the progress of the self is measured not internally, but by examining its effects on the
broader field of which it is a constituent. As Shun writes, “One’s own self-cultivation will
have a transformative and nourishing effect on other things, and such effect is itself a
measure of one’s progress in self-cultivation.”56
As outlined in the second section of this chapter, ancient Chinese thought views
the order of existence as concentric rings, with its constituents organized around the
focusing center. As Plato saw the world organized analogously to the self—the cosmos,
city, and self all divided by ruling and ruled, rational and irrational—so Confucius
perceived order in the world to be analogous to the self—the cosmos, kingdom and self
are all divided between the field of constituents and the focusing particular. To cultivate
the self is in turn to cultivate the field around the self, and although the concentric fields
begin with the family, the rings extend outward, to community, kingdom, and cosmos
itself. Even at such a grand scale, the basic relationship stands, meaning that cultivation
of self is in turn cultivation of cosmos. As Berkson observes, “The cultivation of self is
the root of the order of the family, state, and cosmos; at the same time, the self can
only be cultivated through the connections it has with family, state, and cosmos.”57
The field without the particular individual is indeterminate, nebulous, and is only
truly ordered by the individual located within the field, as a particular focus of the field.
Hall and Ames conceptualize this relationship in terms of the 德 de or excellence of the
particular in relation to the 道 dao or way, the field of tradition which the individual of
excellence organizes around the self. In their words, “When de is cultivated and
accumulated such that the particular is integrated efficaciously into its environments,
the distinction between dao and de, as field and focus, collapses. . . . De is both
particular and its particular field—that is, the field as construed from its perspective. It is
both focus and focused field.”58 It is the particular which gives immediate context to the
network of relationships organized around it, as focus, yet the particular is defined
inseparably through its relationship to the field, so it can also be understood as the
focused field.
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If self is understood in this way, as a point at the center of a field which
reciprocally define each other, then the Confucian definition of self cannot be
constrained to the individual body-mind. The definition of the point cannot be said
without the definition of the field. So Hall and Ames conclude, “The locus of mind is
coterminous with its field of social activity and relations. In the Chinese perspective, the
person extends as far as the roles that define her and through which she expresses
herself.”59

Section 2.4: The Confucian Self in Contrast with the European Self

Having covered the early conceptions of self in both European and Chinese
thought, we can begin to examine the differences between the two. By finding
differences between what is considered fundamental to the self in the East and West,
we begin to understand that any such conception of the self cannot be innate but
instead must be imparted by culture. It is my hope that the gap between what is innate
and what is cultural generated here will provide space for the deconstructionists of the
next two chapters to pry apart what we believe is fundamental to the self and what is
extra.
The most telling difference between East and West lies in their conceptions of
order. Hall and Ames draw a distinction between two manners of conceptualizing order,
the logical and the aesthetic. The logical is conflated with the European, while the
aesthetic is more closely related to the Chinese, although neither region perceives order
in strictly one mode or the other. It is also important to note here that the term
aesthetic is chosen as a contrast to the term logical, and does not necessarily carry any
sense of artistic or pleasing, although it is argued that art is ordered aesthetically more
than logically.
Logical order begins with ideal forms of organization and moves from here to
place particular components in order according to the higher understanding. In logical
order, the uniqueness of each object is abstracted into a general category, allowing for
the interchange of particular parts so long as each fits the needs of the order being
imposed. Henry Ford’s invention of the interchangeable part is a perfect example of
logical order—so long as it fits the ideal form of the piece required, the actual
characteristics of the particular part matter little. Logical order is top-down, abstracting
from the particular such that the particulars are interchangeable—in this way logical
order is composed of components. In contrast, aesthetic order begins with the unique
attributes of the particular constituents in order to organize them into a harmonious
whole. What the whole is cannot be determined until the parts are understood. The
Chinese soup analogy provides an example of aesthetic order—each ingredient of the
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soup must be correctly balanced with the flavors of every other ingredient in order for
the soup to be successful. The order imposed by the soup must create harmony
between the qualities of the ingredients, so this order cannot be determined without
intimate knowledge of the particulars. Aesthetic order is bottom-up, attentive to the
particular such that the particular is not interchangeable—so aesthetic orders are
composed of constituents.
Hall and Ames define the difference between logical and aesthetic order in this
way: “One attends to the manner in which the experienced items instance a given
pattern or set of formal relations, the second notes the manner in which just those
experienced items constitute themselves and their relations to one another in such a
way as to permit of no substitutions.”60 It is interesting to note here that logical and
aesthetic order are inversely related, such that absolute logical order would mean
abstracting away all particulars, while absolute aesthetic order would pay attention to
all particulars such that no abstractions could be formed.61 While human social activity
falls somewhere between the two extremes, the European tendency towards logical
order and the Chinese tendency towards aesthetic order is a distinction which carries
noticeable repercussions in the production of culture.
Although it would be beyond this paper to posit causality, a correlation does
hold between the logical mode of conceiving order and European culture’s need to posit
a higher order to the patterns they perceive—whether it be Plato’s Forms or Einstein’s
theory of relativity, Western cultures search for norms and laws which are universal and
seek to abstract all things into one unified conceptualization. European cultures produce
“concepts of ‘human nature,’ ‘human rights,’ ‘equality under the law,’ and so forth”62
due to the imposition of an order which seeks to abstract from each individual what is
relevant and place them into a system which considers them interchangeable. The
French revolution or the American civil rights movement might be interpreted as the
byproduct of logical ordering.
In contrast, the ordering of society through aesthetic order “will not be open to
the employments of rules, standards, or norms that are presumed to be generalizations
or instances of essential defining characteristics of human beings and of their modes of
togetherness. Neither will consensus be used as objective grounds for social order.”63 It
is rare in Chinese history to find an instance where collective agreement or universal
human rights has successfully served as the grounds for the shifting of power. Instead,
we see generally the accumulation of power in the hands of particular individuals who
have situated themselves at the center of the country through a deep understanding of
the particular forces at work throughout the field.
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The second issue between European and Confucian notions of the self which
must be resolved is the notion of autonomy. Although the Confucian self is considered
irreducibly social, it is not the case that such a self lacks autonomy. While the European
tradition places extreme emphasis on the individual as the means to truth, for the
Confucians it is more the case that the self is best developed in the presence of others.
Autonomy is still present, but it is an autonomy already wrapped up within the social
realm. What is crucial in the exemplary person is not merely participation in ritual, but
authentic performance of the ritual as that which makes us human. In passage 9.24 of
the Analects Confucius emphasizes the value of authentic interaction with ritual: “How
could one but find pleasure in polite language? But the real value lies in drawing out its
meaning.”64
Finally there comes the difficult task of contrasting the European and Chinese
notions of will. The Chinese have two words roughly equivalent to will, 心 xin, heartmind, and 志 zhi, intention. Xin is the self-reflective force within us, examining the self in
order to re-direct it towards greater cultivation. The character zhi contains the character
xin within it, and means what is in the heart-mind, what we have set our hearts on, our
goals and intentions.65 In the Confucian tradition, this faculty is related to the ruling
aspect of the self, or the commander of an army. However, while an army can be
divorced from its commander, the individual cannot be without zhi66, as Confucius
states, “The Combined Armies can be deprived of their commander, but common
peasants cannot be deprived of their purposes (志 zhi).”67
Although this language of the will commanding the other elements of the self
may sound similar to the European conception, it is important to remember the
difference between European and Chinese manners of conceptualization. European
thought generally conceptualizes things independently, such that when the relation
between two things is removed their definitions remain constant, while Chinese thought
conceptualizes correlatively, such that when a relationship between two things is
removed the fundamental definition of both things is altered. While the European
thinker may be able to pluck the faculty of will away from other faculties of the self and
point to its control over all other aspects as evidence of its primacy, for the Chinese
thinker it is merely another aspect of the self which would generate little value in
thinking of it divorced from the other constituents of the self.
This distinction is most telling in light of Descartes’ formulation of will’s
unlimited scope. For Descartes a great problem arises between knowledge and will
because knowledge is seen as finite while the will is infinite. Descartes believed we
could will beyond what we were capable of understanding—this is the source of will’s
primacy as well as the source of man’s sin and error. Yet in classical Chinese thought,
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idea and action are inseparable, meaning that there was no conception of a faculty of
will beyond the actual act of willing. As Hall and Ames write, “the absence in the
classical Chinese tradition of any individual faculty of will distinct from the act of willing
suggests that, for Confucius at least, no distinction is drawn between intentionality and
what is intended. . . . Under this assumption, both intentionality and specific intentions
are, like one’s self, social facts.”68 This lack of a distinct concept of the faculty of will as
divorced from the actual act of willing, as well as the absence of Christianity’s language
of finite and infinite, meant that the will never took on such a problematic, central
character in the Chinese conception of the self.
The questions confronting the European self in these early stages of
conceptualization are born from a tradition which defines things independently of each
other, which perceives order in a logical, universalizing fashion, and believes the inner
realm of the self is the source of truth and certainty. These questions were concerned
with ontology, how being is—if sense experience is to be trusted, which faculty of the
self rules the rest, how to personally remain true to God. The Chinese tradition defines
things correlatively with the things associated with them, perceives order in an aesthetic
fashion, focusing on the particular, and believes that truth and self-fulfillment can only
be found through participation in a social world into which we are already thrown. The
questions confronting the Chinese self concerned correlations, how beings relate—if
ritual social conduct should be strictly followed, how one is to properly cultivate the self
as the specific social roles one inhabits, how to carry out the mandate of the cosmos
through proper social conduct.

Section 2.5: Conclusion

My joking with my roommate Zhou Rui that chilly afternoon in Harbin was a
simple yet powerful indicator of the way in which our culturally transmitted conceptions
of self influence every facet of the way in which we navigate existence. My propensity
for ‘your mother’ jokes and my friend’s aversion to them speaks to more than simply
national trends in humor. Nor is it the case that Zhou Rui loves his mother while I do not.
I believe it has more to do with the way we have constructed our senses of self. When I
was sitting in that room, the boundaries which demarcated my self stopped at the
borders of my flesh—my definition of self was there, affirmed to whatever extent
through a lifetime of relying on myself to provide the final answer as to what made me,
me. I was me, and my mother was my mother, halfway around the world sleeping in her
bed in America. Yet for Zhou Rui, things were different. I had the sense that when I
insulted his mother, I had insulted him. But it was not him personally who was offended,
for I had insulted him plenty—it was his self in the larger sense of the term, the
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correlative, Confucian sense—it was his family which I had insulted. Perhaps, for Zhou
Rui, his sense of self did not stop at his skin, but extended through the bonds which
formed the foundation of his sense of self—he was son, student, and Chinese before he
was any sort of independent Zhou Rui.
Americans carry a skepticism for tradition, customs and formality. We can often
be caught saying, “now that the formalities are over with. . .” We find such things to be
a preamble to authentic interactions, pleasantries we rush through so that we can begin
the real work of interpersonal life. perhaps this is driven by our pragmatism, our need to
get the job done. Or perhaps it has more to do with our incomplete comprehension of
the nature of ritual. In Confucian thought, ritual is the way in which we encounter the
other, it is the sole means by which we cultivate the self and our relations to those
around us.
In the chapter which follows I will first draw on Nietzsche to delineate the
culmination of the Eastern self’s obsession with the will, manifested in the will to power,
the drive to exert one’s will above all else. Then I will read Derrida for his methods of
deconstruction, exposing the European self as I have constructed it to be based upon
binaries which cannot maintain their legitimacy without this binary relationship to
depend upon. Derrida finds that there can be no objective truths, only subjective truths
which carry meaning from one particular perspective or another.
Next, in the fourth chapter I return to the Chinese tradition, this time
constructing the work of the Daoist Zhuangzi as a deconstruction of the Chinese notion
of self. Ultimately, I hope to show that, despite the definite differences between the
European and Chinese conceptions of self, the subsequent deconstruction of these
concepts shares many similar qualities, despite one being espoused by a European
writer of the 20th century and the other being espoused by a man living in 300 BCE.
These similarities point to the way in which such constructions must fall apart under the
reflective eye, and therefore should be treated as such, which will be the argument of
the conclusion.
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Chapter 3: The Deconstruction of the European Self

Section 3.1: The Purpose of This Conceptual Structure

In Chapter 1 I established the traditional conception of the self in European
thought: a coherent whole which has access to truth through rationality, and which is
ordered and directed by the unlimited faculty of will. Chapter 2 describes the traditional
conception of the Chinese self: an irreducibly social, culturally established self cultivated
through harmony with the particulars of the world around it. Now, Chapter 3 marks the
turning point of my argument’s structure, moving from the established
conceptualizations of European and Chinese selfhood to the deconstructive philosophies
which challenge the dominant understanding of the self. This chapter, the chapter on
the deconstruction of the European self, will concern itself with the thought of Friedrich
Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida. Chapter 4 will follow with the Daoist deconstruction of
the Confucian self using the writings of Zhuangzi.
Nietzsche was a German philosopher during the 19th century, whose life work
seemed bent on tearing down the institutions of European philosophy in favor of a more
critical, independent way of thought. He wrote in a maddeningly artistic style, often
making overstated claims without defense, in constant dialogue with philosophers of
the past and the reader himself, hammering and prodding at the roots of established
thought. Indeed, by the end of his life, those with the power of defining sanity declared
that Nietzsche had little left. Regardless, his philosophy served as a source of inspiration
for the 20th century French philosopher Jacques Derrida, whose work channeled the
spirit of Nietzsche’s deconstruction into a much more coherent and exact philosophy.
The Chinese thinker Zhuangzi is thought to have lived around the 4 th century BC,
and similarly challenged the established thought of the time, employing a writing style
comparable to Nietzsche’s—eclectic, conversational, filled with aphorisms and
characters used to illustrate the jumble of ideas he refused to apply structure to,
literally posing questions to both traditional figures of philosophy and the reader. The
gap between these two European thinkers and their Chinese counterpart spans half a
world and nearly the entire stretch of human civilization, yet the resemblance is there.
Surely, much of this connection springs from the pinhole of my own subjectivity, yet I
still believe there is something telling in the development of two similar deconstructive
traditions situated within traditions which have very different things to deconstruct. So
many worlds apart, two traditions have each noticed that structures tend to fall apart,
that there is more meaning in the world than what the dominant discourse has to offer.
I feel compelled to note here that there has been some historical research suggesting a
mixing of European and Chinese thought, specifically in the work of Martin Heidegger, a
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European philosopher influenced by Nietzsche and influencing Derrida.69 But this is the
pursuit of another paper.
I intend to order the thought of these three thinkers along a continuum, a
development of thought moving from the traditional understanding of truth to a
completely deconstructed view of truth. I cast Nietzsche as the forbearer of ‘true’
deconstruction, because his critique of traditional philosophy carries many of the
hallmarks of the deconstructive tradition—the relative, perspectival nature of truth, the
denial of a universal morality, and the tendency of language to mislead our search for
meaning.
However, in his deconstruction of modern philosophy Nietzsche paradoxically
seeks to posit a new universal truth in his conception of the will to power, an ordering
principle which informs the activity of all things. I see the concept of the will to power as
the culmination of the western formulation of the self as directed by the will. The
general outline of Descartes’ and Nietzsche’s formulation of the self are similar—
rejecting all culturally established truths, they turn inward to determine that the will
ultimately rules and directs the self. However, while Descartes’ self is confirmed by God,
established in the truths of his tradition, Nietzsche’s is rooted in a denial of all universal
truths save the truth of the will to power. Fully aware of the relative, empty nature of
truth, the Übermensch or Overman is passionate yet controlled, overcoming the slave
mentality of his culture in order to creatively establish himself against it.
The prioritization of the rational and the will of the individual in the European
tradition culminates in such a self-conception: all things—science, art, philosophy,
history, the nation, the other, the self—all are construed as means to an end, cogs in the
exchange of the only thing which can be an end in and of itself, power. Nietzsche’s
refutation of rationality means that the rational element of the self cannot rule, and
further, that the self cannot be unified, cannot be a coherent self. The traditional
assertion of the existence of a rational unified self is for Nietzsche only another
manifestation of the will to power shaping human beliefs and culture.
Derrida will espouse a method of deconstruction similar to Nietzsche’s in his own,
careful style, but his aim is not to deconstruct the tradition in order to rebuild it himself,
as Nietzsche does, but instead simply to leave the tradition in its deconstructed state.
While for Nietzsche deconstruction leads to reconstruction, for Derrida deconstruction
is the end goal—to challenge the established tradition, creating a space for the
perspective of the other. Derrida’s goal is to problematize established truth, to show
that it is built on arbitrary foundations, without pushing his own view of truth in the
aftermath. The aftermath is enough, to know that truth is relative, to be uneasy about
our beliefs.70 Still with Derrida there remains the paradox of constructing a
deconstruction—how can one posit the fundamental truth of the lack of fundamental
truth?
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This is why I see Nietzsche as the forbearer of ‘true’ deconstruction, while
Derrida represents deconstruction in its ‘purer’ sense. Nietzsche, perhaps due to his
location on the cusp of deconstruction’s emergence in Europe, still seems to have one
foot in the camp of traditional philosophers who use their arguments to posit a
universal truth, evidenced in his assertion that the universe is ordered and moved by
the will to power. It will take Derrida to assert that deconstruction is enough, that in
light of deconstruction we must be uneasy about making truth claims rather than simply
positing a new brand of truth.
Derrida’s philosophy remains within the tradition, challenging the dominant
modes of thought in order to better the tradition as a whole. In contrast, Zhuangzi’s
philosophy ultimately lies at the exterior of the tradition, encouraging his readers to
abandon the pursuit of truth and progress in favor of following the dao or Way. Derrida
teaches us to be uneasy about the foundations of truth from the interior of the tradition,
while Zhuangzi urges us to be at ease with the perspectival nature of truth from the
exterior. Although Zhuangzi must interface with the tradition in order to deconstruct it,
his work offers one solution to the paradox of constructing a deconstruction so
problematic for Nietzsche or Derrida—Zhuangzi’s work is scattered, fragmentary, in
pieces—it is up to the reader to provide interpretation, to structure the work into an
argument with a point. His thought is offered up unconstructed, carrying in its very form
the notion that structures inherently fall apart.

Section 3.2: The Nietzschean Deconstruction of the European Self

Nietzsche’s thought will serve as a bridge between the narrative of the
traditional European self and the deconstruction of Derrida because it displays
characteristics of both traditions. Like Descartes, Nietzsche refutes the thought of all
philosophy before him in order to posit his own conceptual structure. However, while
Descartes’ philosophy ultimately returns to an affirmation of rationality, God, and the
tradition, Nietzsche vehemently refutes rationality’s ability to gain access to a universal
truth, arguing instead that there are no truths but only opinions, beliefs and
interpretations. However, while Nietzsche would tear down traditional thought in order
to posit his theory of the will to power, the aim of Derrida’s deconstruction is simply the
act of deconstruction: to leave room for the voice of the other, to establish a challenge
to dominant thought. In this way Nietzsche is not a true deconstructionist, but rather
utilizes deconstruction to strengthen his own construction.
As I have established in chapter one, the certainty of the European self is
founded upon its claim to have access to truth, an understanding of the ordering
principle of the universe which provides justification for the self to move confidently
into the world. Plato establishes the veracity of his thought by claiming to have access to
the Forms, idealizations which inform the particular instantiation of the thing in the
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world of appearances. For Augustine, the truth of God reached through turning the
senses inward provides the grounds necessary to posit a unified self. Finally, in
Descartes empirical reason is the basis of knowledge, truth accessed through a rational
series of inferences beginning with the certainty of the existence of the thinking subject
itself.
To deconstruct this self which claims to be unified, having access to truth
through rationality, the claim to knowledge of a universal truth must be challenged. In
so challenging, the true nature of truth can be revealed, as relativistic, applicable only in
context. This formulation of truth allows us to see the dominant European construction
of self for what it truly is: a manifestation of the subject’s will to power, claiming access
to Truth as a tool to overcome the other. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche derides
philosophers of the past for their rush to establish themselves as definers of truth: “they
wanted to furnish the rational ground of morality—and every philosopher hitherto has
believed he has furnished this rational ground; morality itself, however, was taken as
‘given.’”71 Nietzsche’s point of contention is that previous philosophers were caught up
in the task of rationally determining the nature of something they assumed existed—
morality itself.
What these philosophers posed as self evident truths were for Nietzsche
baseless assumptions, evidence only of the philosopher’s willingness to posit opinion as
universal truth. As he declares, “the most strongly believed a priori ‘truths’ are for me—
provisional assumptions.”72 Nietzsche challenges Plato’s claim to truth, beginning with
an analysis of one of his own heroes, Socrates. Nietzsche believes Socrates upheld
reason as the most important faculty of man, yet recognized instinct’s inability to
completely align itself to the rule of reason. Nietzsche says first of Socrates,
“Fundamentally he had seen through the irrational aspect of moral judgment.” He
continues, disparaging Plato, who, “more innocent in such things and without the
craftiness of the plebian [Socrates], wanted at the expenditure of all his strength. . . to
prove to himself that reason and instinct move of themselves towards one goal, towards
the good, towards ‘God’; and since Plato all theologians and philosophers have followed
the same path.”73
Nietzsche’s challenge of Plato goes to the beginnings of his philosophy, prior to
when Plato would even believe philosophy begins. Plato believes that to know the form
of the Good is to love it, that man in encountering reason must be ruled by, must find it
compelling, that we are already primed to accept rational morality as truth. What Plato
formulated as access to a higher truth was to Nietzsche merely evidence of Plato’s
privileging of the rational as a means to power.
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Nietzsche also critiques Descartes, striking again at the root of his claim to truth
in order to show that universal truth is only a fabrication of those looking to utilize it in
their formulation of power. Nietzsche writes,
‘There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks’: this is the upshot of
all Descartes’ argumentation. But that means positing as ‘true a priori’ our belief
in the concept of substance—that when there is thought there has to be
something ‘that thinks’ is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that
adds a doer to every deed. . . . Along the lines followed by Descartes one does
not come upon something absolutely certain but only upon the fact of a very
strong belief.74

These last lines bring up what is crucial in Nietzsche’s critique of reason as the means to
truth—in claiming to be upholding the tenets of rational thought and scientific inquiry,
philosophers like Plato and Descartes imply that their beliefs and emotions play no part
in their formulation of truth. If reason rules the tripartite soul as something removed
from the emotional workings of the self, then the rational philosophy produced by such
a self could not have any trace of the spirit or desires.
Yet Nietzsche argues that such a trace is present, a presence which undermines
any claim to rational truth the structure may have. Nietzsche finds that morality is not
built up from a rational base to access truth, but rather that moralities serve a purpose,
are tools generated to reach an end. As he describes, “there are moralities which are
intended to justify their authors before others; other moralities are intended to calm
him and make him content with himself; with others he wants to crucify and humiliate
himself. . . in short, moralities too are only a sign-language of the emotions.”75
Rationality cannot claim dominance if rational structures are generated by emotion
more fundamentally than a rational approach to truth.
This is Nietzsche’s challenge to the rational claim to truth—rationality is not an
end in itself but is instead a means to power, such that when a thinker sets out on a
series of rational deductions the thinker already has the conclusion in mind. Will to
power, and with it desires and emotions, shapes the production of a rational proof more
forcefully than rationality itself. Nietzsche argues, “we suspect any thinker who ‘wants
to prove something’ – that they always knew in advance that which was supposed to
result from the most rigorous cogitation. . . .”76
Nietzsche aims to break down all claims to certainty, all claims to knowledge
beyond the perspective of the subject. He writes, “. . .facts is precisely what there is not,
only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’: perhaps it is folly to want to
do such a thing.”77 There exists no category of knowledge which is true ‘in itself,’
because all knowledge originates from a subject who is implementing that knowledge to
an end. So far, I have described the will to power in terms of the subject exercising it
through various claims to truth, but this is a simplification of the concept. For Nietzsche,
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the will to power is a force which informs all things in the universe, from the exchange
of energy between two microorganisms to the imperialism of one nation over another.
It is not so much that the subject exercises their own will to power, but rather that the
will to power is exercised through them.
The subject cannot exercise the will to power as a faculty of the self because for
Nietzsche the idea of a unified self is also constructed, is itself an expression of the will
to power. In light of the traditional European constructions of self, it should come as no
surprise that a philosophy interested in tearing down the primacy of rationality or truth
should also oppose the unity of the self posited as a result. Indeed, Nietzsche cites the
unqualified positing of the unified self as the event which causes us to posit further
truths. In his words, “‘the subject’ is the fiction that many similar states in us are the
effect of one substratum: but it is we who first created the ‘similarity’ of these states;
our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity (—which
ought rather to be denied—).”78 Nietzsche refutes Plato’s claim that human nature and
rationality tend towards one good, and further refutes Descartes’ claim that the subject
must exist if there is thought. Nietzsche wishes to reverse the traditional view of what
causes a sense of the self as a unified substance prone to rationality. For Nietzsche, it is
the tradition’s need to posit a dominance of rationality, of a coherent subject directing
his entire being through the dominance of the will, which causes it to then posit that
rationality and the will are dominant.
The need to see ourselves as rational and driven by the will is the root of all
further conjecture about the nature of the world. The traditional European view of the
self is of a rational subject which controls the emotions and puts forward a rational
account of the world, giving him access to universal truths. Nietzsche would argue
instead that the self has rationality, but also emotion and desires, and is driven not
through any love of thought or truth but by a will to power. It is the will to accrue power
which causes the subject to posit that he is unified, ruled by rationality, driven by the
will, for this is a formulation which allows him to pursue power in the name of truth or
knowledge, in the name of building a good morality. However, Nietzsche argues that all
moralities are expressions of emotion, not expressions of rational reflection.
So Nietzsche writes, “the belief in substance, accident, attribute, etc., all derive
their convincing force from our habit of regarding all our deeds as consequences of our
will—so that the ego, as substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of change.—But
there is no such thing as will.—”79 Belief in the will as a guiding force of the self is a habit,
not a fundamental aspect of the self. In believing in the self as a rational coherence, we
are habituated to believe in the world as rationally organized. Yet such a belief is not
fundamental but imparted by a tradition founded upon the emotional expressions of
Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, framed as rational and therefore truthful. The
sensation of rationality and the existence of a faculty of will are products of our
interpreting similarity in the myriad emotional states of the self, not products of such
78
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faculties genuinely existing in man. Hence, “there is no such thing as will.” Nietzsche’s
accusation is that the traditional thinkers of European philosophy are engaged in a form
of self-deception, believing they are producing rational evidence of the truth, God, or
the unified self, when in fact such thought is more fundamentally directed by the will to
power. Nietzsche’s own philosophy is equally open to such criticism, although he
acknowledges and embraces rather than denies the part his emotions play in the
generation of his conceptual structure.
Nietzsche sees the dominant tradition as one which encourages the pursuit of
idle happiness, conformity, and the narrowing of perspective. He argues that such a
culture is produced through a sort of Darwinian evolution, meaning that such a culture
came about not through rational development toward a pinnacle of civilization, but
instead because such a culture is best suited for keeping man alive and in control. The
cultural prevalence of trust in reason demonstrates only reason’s utility as a survival
tool, not as proof that such a thing is inherently truth bearing. Nietzsche sees the error
of philosophy so far as the act of positing concepts important to human survival as
fundamentally in the world. As he writes, “we have projected the conditions of our
preservation as predicates of being in general. Because we have to be stable in our
beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the ‘real’ world a world not of change and
becoming, but one of being.”80 Although the world is really in a state of constantly
becoming, it is useful for us to conceptualize things as stable and unchanging, to posit
that there is being rather than becoming. But the understanding of the world as being is
a tool for preservation, not a fact of existence. Truth in a culture arises from thought
founded in utility yet posited as universal.
This brings Nietzsche’s deconstruction of the European self to a close, refuting all
claims to universal truth and the primacy of reason, arguing instead that the self is not
unified, and that all attempts to posit it as such deny the true nature of man—a creature
bred by the will to power.

Section 3.3: Nietzsche and the Will to Power

Nietzsche deconstructs the European conceptualization of truth in order to build
up his own formulation of the world, represented in the enigmatic concept of the will to
power. His definition is that “the will to power is the primitive form of affect, that all
other affects are only developments of it. . . that all driving force is will to power, that
there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this.”81 The will to power is
that aspect of physics, psychology, and evolution which exhibits a force, a drive to
overcome and prosper. It is the first cause of the chain of events of existence, as power
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is the only thing which is sought for its own sake. Power is the only thing which is an end
in itself—therefore, all means are a means to power.
Nietzsche sees any such manifestation of the drive to overcome as a product of
the will to power, indeed, there is nothing which is not principally moved by it. This
encompasses all life, culture, religion, government, consciousness, and the concept of
self. He writes, “The victorious concept ‘force,’ by means of which our physicists have
created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed
to it, which I designated as ‘will to power,’ i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power;
or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc.”82 It would be
incorrect, in such a construction, to simply contend that the notion of God was created
by man’s inward knowledge of his imperfection, a claim made by Descartes. Rather, the
creation of God is a product of the will to power, the will to overcome, to order the
other—God is a means to power, not a means to truth. (Truth, too, is will to power.)
This will to overcome is not the will of the unified self which Descartes believed ruled
the soul, but is rather the inner driving force which moves all things to competition, the
force which would drive a creature like Descartes to even posit the existence of such a
will.
Yet the will to power does not merely manifest in the conceptual structures of
man. It is the ordering principle of all organic life, moreover the ordering principle of all
becoming, living or otherwise. So Nietzsche argues, “in the case of an animal, it is
possible to trace all its drives to the will to power; likewise all the functions of organic
life to this one source.”83 Additionally, he contends, “For what do the trees in a jungle
fight each other? For ‘happiness’?—for power!— ”84 Phototrophic prokaryotes battled
each other 3 billion years ago as embodiments of the will to power, and all organic life
since has been a continuation of this conflict.
And man is no different. Indeed, man is a particularly good example of the
flexing of the will to power upon substance. As Nietzsche describes, “man, become
master over the forces of nature, master over his own savagery and licentiousness (the
desires have learned to obey and be useful)—man, in comparison with a pre-man—
represents a tremendous quantum of power—not an increase in ‘happiness’!”85 Here
we can begin to understand the European construction of self as nothing greater than a
manifestation of the rote drive to compete, as in bacteria, so no different in man. To
develop tools, physical and conceptual, to project order onto the chaos of becoming,
positing the existence of being, to develop reason and control the spirit and desires, to
invent civilization, all these are means to power—as the prokaryote develops flagella, so
we develop God and Truth. Yet nowhere in the world exterior to man are God and Truth
to be found. They originate in man, as means to power.
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With such a formulation, it becomes clear that consciousness itself has
developed as a means to power. As Nietzsche writes, “becoming conscious is obviously
only one more means toward the unfolding and extension of the power of life.”86
Moreover, Nietzsche argues that life itself is merely one form of the will to power,
merely one way in which power is pursued. Hence, it cannot be the case that the human
will, as formulated by Descartes, can be at all compared with the will to power as
formulated by Nietzsche. The only relation will as a faculty of the self has with the will to
power is that the human faculty is merely a manifestation of the will to power, as
another means to power, like the concept of God, or rationality. So Nietzsche contends,
That the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will
does not exist at all, that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one
definite will into many forms, one has eliminated the character of the will by
subtracting from it its content, its ‘whither?’. . . . It is even less a question of the
‘will to live’; for life is merely a special case of the will to power;—it is quite
arbitrary to assert that everything strives to enter into this form of the will to
power.87

Nietzsche’s contention with the traditional conception of will is that it fails to take into
account what is willed, its “whither,” that what is willed can be interpreted accurately
only as the accumulation of power. In understanding this, we find that the self’s faculty
of will is not the driving element of the self but is rather just another element of the
driving force, the will to power. Not only is the traditional European conception of the
self merely an arbitrary expression of the will to power, the self, the will, consciousness,
even life itself, are all arbitrary expressions of the original affecting force.
For Nietzsche, culture and ethics manifest will to power by stifling individual
freedom and creativity so as to control the masses. This ‘herd mentality’ keeps the
masses under control by espousing complacent happiness as the goal of all life.
Happiness as the goal of civilized life can be seen in the Greek’s pursuit of eudemonia,
happiness or flourishing, the Christian ideal of faith, patience in God’s plan during
physical life in exchange for eternal salvation of the soul, and today in material gain as
the end of life. Culture shaped by the will to power does not encourage man to achieve
his highest potential, his highest formulation of power, but rather encourages man to
achieve his greatest state of mollification. Docility is the ideal of the cultured man. As
Nietzsche puts it, “This is why ethics, with its unconscious instinct for education and
breeding, has hitherto aimed at holding the desire for power in check: it disparages the
tyrannical individual and with its glorification of social welfare and patriotism
emphasizes the power-instinct of the herd.”88 One has only to watch traffic on a busy
highway or a stadium of sports fans to see the herd mentality present in civilized life. Do
the businessmen in silk suits honking at each other through their luxury cars in the crawl
of bumper-to-bumper traffic behave so differently from a herd of cattle? I believe one
has merely to compare the two in order to understand that the force which organizes
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both forms of life is the same. Power is the end, and docility of group behavior is the
means.
At this point I want to use Nietzsche’s concepts of the will to power and the herd
mentality to formulate my own understanding of culture, an understanding somewhat
divorced from Nietzsche’s. Nietzsche held strong value judgments concerning particular
cultures, believing the Greeks and Romans had a strong, or ‘master’ morality, while
modern Christian culture taught a submissive, or ‘slave’ morality. However, such
valuations do not hold much currency for me. Perhaps they are a product of his struggle
to topple Christian morality, representations of the will to power acting on his historical
perspective. Regardless, I am instead concerned with arguing that all cultures are
entities which manifest the will to power through manipulation of the populace which
supports it. Culture is the will to power acting through man in its most developed state,
herding us by the millions into great wars, genocide, and economic combat, keeping us
satiated and mollified, causing us to train our children to perpetuate its life cycle.
Culture is a beast whose body spans entire continents, composed of billions of individual
cells, none of which can totally control that which exerts dominance over them.
So I begin by arguing that man is not in control of culture, is not generating it as
a product of civil life. Rather, culture controls man. Like all things, culture is moved by
the pursuit of power, and culture’s means to power is domination of the herd. Culture
teaches us to reproduce culture, the way a virus teaches a host cell to reproduce the
same virus. We are born into a culture, and within any successful culture are always
mechanisms which teach each successive generation to continue to uphold the same
culture. We are taught not only to maintain culture, but are also taught to not destroy
culture, as shown in the herd’s pursuit of happiness as the end of life. The will to power
of culture is exercised by dampening the will to power of the individual which it
dominates, by teaching the individual to simply participate in and accept culture rather
than to reject and question it.
The analogy comparing culture and the herd to a virus and a host cell remains
useful. The virus, technically, is non-living—it is merely a coil of genetic information
wrapped in a protective shell. When it infects the host cell, the mechanisms of the host
normally used to produce things useful to the host are instead turned to the production
of more viruses. In the same way, culture ‘infects’ the host populace, as the newest
generation is reared, they are inoculated with cultural norms and ideals, including the
norms which cause us to teach our children culture as well as the pursuit of
complacency as a cultural value. Although culture exercises power over us, in
understanding the relationship between culture and the herd in this way we gain power
over culture. The virus dominates the host cell, yet the virus also needs the host cell,
whereas the host cell does not need the virus. Culture dominates us, yet also needs us—
human beings are culture’s roots in substance. Culture, an entirely conceptual
phenomenon, needs the beings it dominates in order to continue itself.
At some point in the evolution of life on this planet, single-celled organisms
joined together to create multi-cellular organisms, and through this collective action
gained access to a higher order of power. Culture bears a similar quality in its unification

48

of disparate men, organizing them into a higher stratum of power. The multi-cellular
organism orders its constituent parts toward its own ends, ends which are the individual
cell’s only because of its association with the whole. They are provided for by the multicellular whole, yet also enslaved to its purposes. Analogously, culture provides for its
people, creating standards of morality and progress which can empower the individual
to heights of power beyond what he could achieve on the exterior of culture. Yet culture
also controls man, keeping him complacent by training him to pursue simple happiness
rather than an authentically lived life, moving him to compete with other cultures in the
constant struggle for power. In such a formulation we must ask, do we act through
culture, or does culture act through us?
Nietzsche believes resistance of this societal mollification is the basis of
becoming an authentic self, the basis of his ideal man, the Übermensch or Overman. If
culture flexes its will to power by inducing us to pursue happiness, then the individual
exercises his will to power by resisting society in the pursuit of freedom rather than
happiness. So Nietzsche writes, “The degree of resistance that must be continually
overcome in order to remain on top is the measure of freedom, whether for individuals
or for societies—freedom understood, that is, as positive power, as will to power.”89
Nietzsche believes the boundaries of freedom are most clearly defined when it is sorely
lacking, such that the individual most representative of Nietzsche’s ideal of freedom, of
the man pursuing his own will to power over against the will to power of his culture,
emerges most clearly in times when culture is strongest, at its most tyrannical.
The individual must always recognize the power relation between culture and
self in order to give up the pursuit of happiness to instead pursue the realization of his
will to power. When society is most oppressive is when this choice which is always
present for the individual becomes most glaring, and likewise when society is at its most
liberal that the choice becomes most difficult to perceive. Man, too, is moved only by
the will to power, and in realizing this, we see that there is no choice, that mollification
properly understood is no longer an option. As Nietzsche contends, “One must have no
choice: either on top—or underneath, like a worm, mocked, annihilated, trodden upon.
One must oppose tyrants to become a tyrant, i.e., free.”90
Rather than pursue happiness, such a person gains pleasure in the exertion of
the will against those things which stand against him. In Nietzsche’s words, “it is not the
satisfaction of the will that causes pleasure. . . but rather the will’s forward thrust and
again and again becoming master over that which stands in its way. The feeling of
pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact that the will is never
satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance.—‘The happy man’: a herd ideal.”91
Happiness is a false goal, generated by the development of cultures which train humans
to be docile as a means for the culture’s will to power. In order to properly pursue
freedom, as a positive manifestation of our own will to power, we must be in a constant
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struggle with those things which limit our power. This is the root of true pleasure. Such a
will is not the will developed by Descartes, as a part which unifies the whole, for the
unity of the whole is a falsity generated by the pursuit of power. Rather, the self’s will
for Nietzsche is the same as the will of all things, as the inner force which drives the
thing to compete and overcome.
In deconstructing the traditional accounts of the self, we are left with an
understanding that any conceptual structure aimed at positing access to Truth or a unity
of the self is at root a manifestation of the will to power acting through the subject. The
faculty of conscious thought necessary to develop such conceptual structures is
understood merely as the next step in the development of power. The will to power
manifested first in the form of life itself, which then found greater power in multicellular organisms, then with consciousness, and finally a conception of the self as a
unified substance, what Nietzsche sees as the catalyst for producing value judgments,
morality, ontology, and culture.
In trying to get a clear view of what exactly the self is in light of this
deconstruction of traditional thought and the subsequent reconstruction as a means for
the will to power, I believe a comparison will be helpful. Specifically, I want to draw
connections between culture’s relationship to the herd and the self’s relationship to the
multi-cellular structure of the body and mind. I have formulated culture as a thing which
exerts its will to power over an aggregate collection of parts, in this case individual
people, providing for these parts but also directing them towards culture’s struggle
against other cultures and the perpetuation of the culture’s own existence. Culture
generates an abundance of conceptual structures—nationalism, democracy, human
rights, freedom of speech, slavery, ad infinitum—but these must ultimately be
understood as means to further empowerment for the culture.
Analogously, the self is a purely conceptual phenomenon which exerts its will to
power over the parts, in this case cells, which compose its roots in substance. These
various cells are provided for by the self, gaining the proper nutrients and environment
they need, yet they are also dominated, bent towards ends which further the power of
the self, and not necessarily the power of the individual cell. The cells necessary for such
an organism to have the faculty of consciousness developed as a means to power, and
as such we must understand that like cultures the individual self will produce all manner
of conceptual structures— access to the Form of the Good, God, free will, the will to
power, etc.—as means to further their power over the world around them.
Such a comparison, while certainly of dubious scientific grounding,92 can
nonetheless provide further insight into the role of the self within culture. Only the most
evolutionarily advanced cells, those of the brain and nervous system, can be said to
control the multi-cellular organism, as the site of the chemical interactions which are
the necessary conditions for consciousness and the production of the concept self.
Analogously, it should hold that only those with a high degree of power within a culture
92
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have the power to shape culture’s course. Although we do not yet fully understand the
human brain, it seems safe to argue that no single neuron dictates the operations of the
self. As Nietzsche has shown in his deconstruction of the European self, there is no unity
of self, no dominance of one faculty over another, but rather a competition of opposing
forces. Similarly, no single person or organization dictates the machinations of a culture,
for culture’s direction is instead the product of the exertion of the forces of the
‘controlling’ class of people against one another.
The comparison of culture and the herd to the self and the multi-cellular
organism causes one to question whether or not self-determination exists for the
individual under the organizing dominance of culture. With the occasional exception of
male spermatozoa, to venture forth from the multi-cellular organism means certain
death for the individual cell. We tend to understand the goals of the cell to be
synonymous with the goals of the self. Cells exist entirely for the execution of the self’s
ends. Should it then be argued that the individual exists entirely for the execution of
culture’s ends? To pose the question in this way seems to betray the extent to which we
still rely on the traditional conceptions of the self. The self is not a transcendent entity,
unified in its pursuit of goals through utilization of the cells which compose its body.
Rather, the self is merely a conceptual structure, generated by a collection of highly
evolved cells which exert competing forces upon each other. Therefore, in our
comparison, it would be incorrect to formulate culture as a transcendent entity which
dictates the activities of man. On the contrary, culture is itself merely a conceptual
structure generated by the competing forces of its ‘nervous system,’ those individuals
who have accumulated enough power to influence the interplay of competing forces.
Culture is not a unity, but is instead a conceptual structure generated by the competing
voices of the powerful which in turn exerts its power over the herd.
Despite the seemingly insidious character of culture, like the cell of an animal,
the individual human has little recourse but to participate or face certain, lonely death.
Here we must look beyond subjective valuations of good and bad in order to understand
culture as another function of the will to power manifested in the process of life. In the
same way that we would see the consumption of one amoeba by another as a fact of
natural life, and not of evil forces acting upon good, so we must also see culture as a fact
of natural life. This necessary participation is evidenced by the way in which we must
use traditional conceptual structures even as we deconstruct them. Nietzsche seems to
support this analysis. He begins by arguing that all beliefs in truths are founded on the
original belief in the ego as a substance, in the self as a unity. He concludes, “here we
come to a limit: our thinking itself involves this belief (with its distinctions of substance,
accident; deed, doer, etc.); to let it go means: being no longer able to think.”93 Raised in
a culture which espouses such beliefs, even in rejecting them we are unable to form
concepts without the use of these false-truths. Hence, we must still use such concepts in
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order to continue living. So Nietzsche writes, “All ideals are dangerous: because they
debase and brand the actual; all are poisons, but indispensable as temporary cures.”94
Nietzsche challenges all claims to truth through rationality, refuting the unity of
the self. He argues that there is no unifying principle, that any attempt to posit such a
thing is really a manifestation of the philosopher’s will to power, of the competing
forces of his nervous system, a product as much of emotion as of rationality. Any code
of morality is a means used by culture to control the herd, to pacify and stunt the
individual’s will to power. Yet in positing the will to power as a unifying principle, and
advocating that the Übermensch reject the herd morality in order to properly realize his
own will to power, Nietzsche has posited a morality. He has generated a construction
which is open to the same deconstructive arguments he has applied to thinkers before
him.
This is Nietzsche’s paradox, deconstructing all previous moralities as generated
by the will to power of their culture to then posit his own morality. He refutes the unity
of the self under the traditional formulation of will, only to then argue that the ideal
man must direct himself in life according to Nietzsche’s own formulation of the will.
Even if we are to believe that Nietzsche’s version of morality has somehow broken free
from society’s dominance over man, the Übermensch must still act in a world defined by
belief in the unity of the self and the primacy of rationality. Nietzsche himself posits
‘truths’ and ‘facts’ about the world, despite his assertion that there are no facts, but
only interpretations. For Nietzsche, perhaps, there is no way out of this paradox, no way
to posit the truth of the will to power without being contradictory. As he contends, all
ideals are dangerous, but are also indispensable as temporary cures. Derrida and
Zhuangzi, however, provide a solution to the paradox of deconstructing to reconstruct:
They stop at deconstruction.

Section 3.4: Derrida and The Metaphysics of Presence

Jacques Derrida was a French philosopher who wrote through the 1960s into the
1990s. Two of his greatest inspirations were Nietzsche and another, later German,
Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche’s project we are familiar with, challenging established
thought as enslaving and mollifying, calling for the authentic individual to properly
realize his will to power over against the dominant discourse. Heidegger, partially in
response to Nietzsche’s work, outlined the fundamental problem with European
philosophy as he saw it: the ontic-ontological distinction. As he sees it, the problem with
European philosophy was that it assumed the presence of being, as opposed to the
partial presence of becoming.
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From these two thinkers before him, Derrida takes up the task of challenging the
dominant tradition, which he dubs the ‘metaphysics of presence’—a philosophy of
existence which believes that transcendental signifiers, ideas like truth or reason, must
necessarily exist in the present because they are perceived as such. Ultimately, Derrida
wants to deconstruct the dominant tradition, not in order to replace it with the thought
of the dominated, but instead to problematize the dominant tradition’s claim to
transcendental truth. For Derrida the result of this deconstruction is a recognition that
one’s conceptualizations are unstable, tenuous, that we must constantly question the
grounds upon which we take ethical or political action. Derrida wants to place moral
responsibility entirely upon the subject and deny this subject recourse to logic or
transcendental truths as a means of shirking such responsibility.
Where Nietzsche deconstructs only to reconstruct the tradition according to his
own vision of the will to power, Derrida’s philosophy offers a way out of this
contradiction by simply completing his task at the point of deconstruction. Yet here
Derrida encounters his own paradox. His theory of deconstruction, although formulated
with writing in mind, can be applied to the notion of the self which the dominant
tradition has produced. Read in this way, Derrida’s philosophy seems to indicate that
there can be no a priori self, that the concept of self is merely a production of the
subject differentiating. Yet after deconstructing the dominant tradition, Derrida seems
to cling to his sense of self which this tradition has produced, as evidenced in his
assertion that we must doubt the self, yet still remain within the tradition, to
problematize and open the way for full acceptance of moral responsibility.
The philosophy of Zhuangzi, which will be covered in the next chapter, carries
many similarities to Derrida’s. It can even be argued that the Dao 道, or way, as
Zhuangzi articulates it is identical to Derrida’s concept of différance, in that both are the
way in which things are differentiated from one another. Both thinkers discover similar
symptoms due to this concept—the relativity of meaning in binaries, the limits of
language in speaking about truth—yet they draw different conclusions about how to act.
While Derrida calls for a perpetual challenging of the confidence of the self, Zhuangzi
recommends that we stop pursuing knowledge altogether, that instead we foster an
enjoyment of the constantly changing nature of the world, losing our attachment to the
unity of the self as we cease to privilege one state of being over another.
I begin my construction of Derrida’s argument here in the 4th section of this
chapter, with his challenge of logocentrism, the belief that speech is more meaningful
than writing. For Derrida, speech is always done in relation to writing, is in a way a form
of writing. Derrida then challenges dualistic conceptualization—a challenge borrowed
from Nietzsche’s toolkit—showing that in any binary relationship, the dominant pole is
dependent upon the other pole for meaning, and that they are thereby equally valid.
The objective here is to problematize any claims to a priori truths, in order to
demonstrate instead that all statements or claims are only provisionally useful.
This leads into the 5th section, where I will try to illustrate the meaning of
deconstruction for Derrida. The objective of deconstruction is ultimately to create an
ethical demand to hear the perspective of the other as a supplement to the dominant
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perspective. First, it must be understood that deconstruction is not a process, but is
instead simply a phenomena which occurs when there are structures. To convey his
argument, Derrida now invents a new word: différance. Différance is the occurrence of
differentiation, the thing which allows us to create dualistic conceptions. When there is
differentiation, there is différance. As one pole of a binary relationship is only
meaningful in the context of the binary, there cannot be a thing which has intrinsic
meaning. Rather, all things are defined only in relation to other things, creating a chain
of meaning between concepts which informs all concepts. This is what Derrida dubs the
trace, the presence of all other names wrapped up in the definition of one name, such
that we can only understand a thing through the trace of all other things which it is
not—an understanding made possible by différance.
Finally, I turn Derrida’s deconstruction upon the notion of the self. As the
faculties of will or reason are defined only in relation to other faculties of the self, these
things cannot be inherent in the self but are instead simply the play of différance
differentiating one thing from another. Despite his philosophy refuting the self, Derrida
seems to cling to his concept of self, calling for us to question the assuredness of our
moral perspective, but not the assuredness of our sense of self. It will take Zhuangzi in
the next chapter to explore the ramifications of living without the self.
Derrida’s project is to problematize the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ the dominant
European philosophical tradition which claims to have access to the world as being, as
opposed to becoming, a conclusion reached through the prioritization of speech over
writing, what Derrida calls logocentrism. In this way, his goal is similar to Nietzsche’s or
my own. As he sees it, his work continues a project, “the undermining of an ontology
which, in its innermost course, has determined the meaning of being as presence and
the meaning of language as the full continuity of speech.”95 Ontology is the study of
existence, the nature of being. For Derrida what is important in ontology is whether or
not there are static beings (the traditional view) or something altogether different, a
constantly shifting field of meaning created through the differentiation of things, a
model which posits that only becoming is, and that the idea of beings is merely a
subjective projection upon this process of becoming.
Derrida maintains that one of the principle errors of the metaphysics of presence
is a ‘vulgar concept of time,’ a phrase borrowed from Heidegger. With this ‘vulgar
concept of time,’ traditional European philosophy takes the basic notion that time
progresses in a linear fashion and from this draws a series of erroneous conclusions
about the nature of language. For Derrida, such a misunderstanding of language’s
relationship to time “was not born out of a philosopher’s carelessness or from a
theoretical lapse. It is intrinsic to the totality of the history of the Occident, of what
unites its metaphysics and its technics.”96
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What Derrida is challenging is the traditional understanding of how language
relates to the thing it represents. Derrida views language in terms of two things, the
signifier and the signified. When we see a tree, the signified, and want to tell or write to
someone else about it, we use its signifier, the word ‘tree.’ The relationship between
signifier and signified is arbitrary, there is nothing inherent in this bark-covered leafy
structure which means tree, rather, we name it tree as a utilitarian gesture, in order to
differentiate it from other things or ideas. Hence, words gain their meaning from their
relationships to other words, not to the thing they signify. Therefore, the meaning of a
word carries with it the trace of the meaning of all other words, for it is only in relation
to other signifiers which the word tree becomes significant, not its relationship with the
signifier, the particular tree.
However, the dominant tradition has lost sight of this trace, this way in which
words depend upon each other for meaning. This is due to the prioritization of speech
over writing, the justification for which is that speech must have occurred
anthropologically before writing, and must therefore be more meaningful. However,
Derrida believes that speech carries with it the act of writing, that speech depends upon
writing to the extent that the signifiers used in speech can only be defined against the
entire field of signifiers which compose a language, a field created as much in writing as
in speech. Here too Derrida finds traditional philosophy’s ‘vulgar concept of time’ has
further obscured a complete understanding of language, such that signifiers are not only
meaningful horizontally, in relation to other signifiers at that moment, but also vertically,
across time, in relation to the same signifier at different times, both its past meanings
and its possible future meanings. For Derrida, when we speak, we do so in relation to
writing, such that the signifiers we use carry meaning only in relation to the field of
other signifiers, both past and future.
Such an understanding of language contradicts the traditional philosophical view,
most importantly in that it denies the existence of a transcendental signifier. The
transcendental signifier occurs when the signified transmits, in and of itself, without
outside reference to other signifiers, the meaning of its signifier. We find such an idea in
Plato’s idea of the Form of the Good, a thing which, once perceived, is understood in
and of itself, and further informs the subject’s understanding of all other things.
Augustine discovers another transcendental signifier in his inward experience with God,
encountering Him and knowing solely through this encounter what He is. For Derrida, of
course, the occurrence of a transcendental signified is impossible. It is a problem of
incorrectly conflating how reality works with how our language works. Simply because
the word is spoken, signifies, at this moment, does not mean that all its significance is
also wrapped up in this moment. Rather, all its meaning cannot be in the present, for
the signifier is only meaningful through its relationships across writing as well as time.
This can be seen as a continuation of Nietzsche’s critique, in which he attacks
Descartes’ claim that there is a subject simply because linguistically there must be one.
To claim that a unified subject, an ‘I’ exists because you are able to say “I think,
therefore I am,” is to believe that our language exactly reflects the way in which reality
operates. In Derrida’s words, “the play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and
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referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present
in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written
discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which
itself is not simply present.”97
Derrida believes that by showing the real way in which language works, in
contrast to how Plato, Augustine or Descartes understood it, the legitimacy of the
dominance of traditional European philosophy can be called into serious question. If all
signifiers rely upon other signifiers for meaning, then those signifiers in a binary or
dualistic relationship, such as moral and immoral, good and evil, right and wrong, can
only be said to exist to the extent that the other pole exists. We cannot posit that good
exists without implicitly arguing that evil exists. On the contrary, the concept of good
can exist only to the extent that there is also a concept of evil. The dominance of Plato’s
reason can only exist to the extent that he has also defined the desires as inferior. If the
desires do not exist, then reason also cannot exist. In this way, reason cannot be a
transcendental signifier, but is instead simply an arbitrary differentiation between two
things, a differentiation which Plato erroneously believed held sway in reality due to its
ability to be put into language. As Michelle Yeh describes it, “Derrida seeks out the
manifest or concealed hierarchy on which the text under consideration is based and, by
focusing on the inferior or negative term that is being repressed, demonstrates that the
superior term actually relies on the very same conditions of possibility the inferior term
does.”98 Descartes’ positing of the existence of a unified subject points not to the a
priori existence of a unified subject, but rather to the existence of a differentiation
between unified and non-unified subject.
Given such an understanding of language—that it is an arbitrary differentiation
between two poles—transcendental or absolute meaning of a signifier cannot exist.
Instead, words are only meaningful in context, as temporary transmissions of binary
relationships. As Nietzsche puts it, language is a poison, but indispensable as a
temporary cure. Derrida frames it in this way, “if words and concepts receive meaning
only in sequences of differences, one can justify one’s language, and one’s choice of
terms, only within a topic [an orientation in space] and an historical strategy. The
justification can therefore never be absolute or definitive.”99 By re-defining our
understanding of language, Derrida has problematized the dominant tradition’s claim to
transcendental truth, showing instead that differentiation between terms is really only a
temporary tool. This understanding allows us to move into Derrida’s conceptualization
of deconstruction, which will require a thorough understanding of the term différance.
Once these have been covered, we can apply Derrida’s deconstruction to the notion of
self, showing that, although Derrida wants to remain within the dominant discourse in
order to problematize it, his philosophy of deconstruction suggests that the unity of the
self required to do so may be untenable.
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Section 3.5: Derrida, Différance, and the Deconstruction of the European Self

In order to properly express his understanding of how meaning is generated in
language, Derrida invents a new word, différance. The concept of différance represents
the process of differentiation, the play of relative meaning. The spelling of différance
represents the way it operates in speech. Like in the French, the change of the ‘e’ in
difference to the ‘a’ of différance is silent in speech yet visible in writing. We know of
the difference between the two words, but this difference cannot be said. When we
think of the meaning of a word, we do not understand it through what it signifies, as a
transcendental signifier, but rather through its differentiation with the rest of language,
through what it is not.100 We know that language is meaningful through differentiation,
but we are not aware of this differentiation. Différance, like the ‘a’ which differentiates
it from difference, is not noticeable in speech. Yet it is différance which allows for the
production of meaning through the creation of differences. As Derrida describes it,
“différance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the
spacing by means of which elements are related to each other.”101
Différance, despite its importance in Derrida’s system of thought, is not an
overarching rule or transcendental signified, but is instead simply another concept. As
Wayne D. Ownes notes, “‘differance’ is not a transcendental or metaphysical category
of discourse. It is simply the process of differing.”102 Différance is the process of differing,
a process which always occurs in a context, such that differences can never be absolute
or transcendental, but always only relative and subjective. Difference is constantly at
play, constantly being generated, such that the totality of difference could never be
circumscribed through careful study. So Derrida writes, “the activity or productivity
connoted by the a of différance refers to the generative movement in the play of
differences. The latter are neither fallen from the sky nor inscribed once and for all in a
closed system, a static structure that a synchronic and taxonomic operation could
exhaust.”103
Moreover, différance is not a concept or a word, in effect, it cannot be named.
Yeh writes, “Derrida repeatedly warns against turning differance into a concept, for,
differing from and contradicting within itself, differance cannot be a concept; it is an
anti-concept or rather a nonconcept that functions as a concept.”104 Différance is the
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process of differing, and so does not exist before this differentiation occurs, cannot be
named or defined as a concept apart from the differentiation which marks its
occurrence. In the same way that the ‘a’ which distinguishes it is silent, undetectable yet
leaving a trace in the text, so différance is itself un-definable yet present. So Derrida says,
“the motif of différance, when marked by a silent a, in effect plays neither the role of a
‘concept,’ or simply of a ‘word’. . . . This does not prevent it from producing conceptual
effects and verbal or nominal concretions.”105
The idea that meaning is merely created in the play of différance, that language
does not gain its meaning from the thing being spoken of, but instead only through the
trace of what it is not, construed by the subject over language and time, invalidates any
metaphysics which uses a transcendental signifier as its justification. So Derrida argues,
“it could be shown that metaphysics has always consisted in attempting to uproot the
presence of meaning, in whatever guise, from différance.”106 For example, Augustine’s
proof of God’s existence is that in perceiving His presence (the signified), the name God
(the signifier) in all its meaningfulness came to him. That this signifier God is meaningful
in and of itself, that in the presence of this word alone—and in the temporal sense, in
the present moment of perceiving it alone—the meaning of the word God came through
to Augustine denies the true nature of the word. Rather, the word God is rendered
meaningful, and even existent, only through the play of différance, only in its
differentiation from other words, not present in speaking but leaving their trace, and in
its differentiation from the same word over time, in the trace of the meaning of the
word God in the past and future.
The word God is not objectively meaningful, in the world outside of human
perception, but is instead generated through the differentiation of the subject as it uses
language. To believe that God exists in and of Himself is to believe that reality is ordered
like our language, that a signified with a transcendental signifier must therefore be
metaphysically transcendental, needing only the presence of itself to be meaningful.
This is the metaphysics of presence intrinsic to European thought.107
Having established the nature of his deconstruction, Derrida must establish what
he intends to do with his deconstruction. Having deconstructed traditional philosophy
before him, Nietzsche posits a new overarching concept, the will to power, showing all
philosophy and existence to be directed by the drive to overcome. Conversely, Derrida
wishes to deconstruct in order to problematize, to make room for the voice of the other
in the dialogue of the dominant, to partially break open the closed-off discourses of
philosophy, ethics, and politics dominated by the metaphysics of presence without
completely breaking them apart. Derrida wishes to deconstruct, not destroy. As he
develops it, the purpose of this general strategy of deconstruction “is to avoid both
simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing within the
closed field of these oppositions, thereby confirming it.”108
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Again like Nietzsche, Derrida’s deconstruction now reaches a paradox.
Deconstruction can only take place within the dominant tradition, as a response to the
established tradition—there cannot be deconstruction without a structure. Yet what
deconstruction brings to the structure is wholly outside it, for it brings the entire
structure itself into question. Derrida’s deconstruction denies any transcendental truth
to the metaphysics of presence, a denial which denies such a metaphysics its very
foundation, its justification for action. Yet the deconstruction must still use the language
of the metaphysics of presence to generate its deconstruction. So Derrida continues,
“therefore we must proceed using a double gesture, according to a unity that is both
systematic and in and of itself divided, a double writing, that is, a writing that is in and of
itself multiple. . .”109 The dualism of unity and non-unity itself falls apart, such that the
tradition can be said to be both unified and not unified from certain perspectives, at
certain moments, but neither is true absolutely.
Having covered Derrida’s conceptualization of deconstruction, we can now look
to deconstruct the self. Understanding language as the play of différance, and therefore
unable to support the transcendental signifier, Derrida calls for us to be a self which is
always uncertain of what we believe, of the justifications for our ethical and moral
actions. He advocates a recognition of our subjectivity, and our subsequent inability to
completely circumscribe the moral ramifications of a given situation. As Robert J.
Shepherd writes, “perfect knowledge, hence absolutely certain decisions, is impossible.
This being the case, Derrida argues for the recognition of the personal responsibility that
all decisions carry, a responsibility that cannot be shielded by the comforts of rational
calculation or denied by falling back on the logic of cause and effect.”110
Belief in the a priori truth of a transcendental signifier allows one to justify one’s
actions in light of this truth, allowing for a stability of purpose which denies the voice of
the other through a confidence that there is no truth external from that already
possessed. Derrida’s project is to problematize these a priori truths, showing them to be
like any other word in language, meaningful only relatively and never absolutely true. So
Derrida argues, “if there were continual stability, there would be no need for politics,
and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential, or substantial, that politics
exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the
possible and the impossible cross each other.”111 It is in the chaos of language
differentiating through the play of différance that meaning is generated, and it is upon
this meaning that ethics and morality are founded. Therefore, we cannot forget that our
morality is founded in relative dualistic conceptualizations, and should never treat it as
anything more than the production of a subjective mind.
However, the purpose of my conceptual structure is to deconstruct the self, not
the ethics which it practices. Although Derrida is concerned with the operations of the
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text, his deconstructive philosophy applies also to the self, to the extent that the
concepts of the self—the will, emotions, rationality—are also dualistic differentiations
produced by the metaphysics of presence. So Derrida contends, “the presence-absence
of the trace. . . carries in itself the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul,
and of all the problems whose primary affinity I have recalled.”112 All of the binaries
developed as a priori truths by the traditional European philosophers—rationality and
desire, body and mind, Godhood and imperfection, will and understanding—owe their
existence and following to the metaphysics of presence’s denial of the play of différance
and the trace of the not-present.
Indeed, the ability for the subject to constitute the concept of self relies on the
play of différance. As Derrida says, différance “confirms that the subject, and first of all
the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the
movement of différance, that the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself,
in becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral. . .”113 The conceptualization of the
subject as a self is a differentiation, and therefore carries the trace of all other language.
This means that the self is not stable, not transcendental, but only a temporary truth.
Derrida continues:
At the point at which the concept of différance, and the chain attached to it,
intervenes, all the conceptual oppositions of metaphysics. . .—to the extent that
they ultimately refer to the presence of something present (for example, in the
form of the identity of the subject who is present for all his operations, present
beneath every accident or event, self-present in its ‘living speech,’ in its
enunciations, in the present objects and acts of its language, etc.)—become
nonpertinent. They all amount, at one moment or another, to a subordination
of the movement of différance in favor of the presence of a value or a meaning
supposedly antecedent to différance, more original than it, exceeding and
governing it in the last analysis. This is still the presence of what we called above
the ‘transcendental signified.’114

As Derrida sees it, the self as a thing which is unified in its actions, directed by an
overarching force such as reason or the will, always present whenever the bodily
organism is present, is itself a transcendental signifier, a fallacy generated by traditional
philosophy, the metaphysics of presence. Rather, the unity of the self is only a
differentiation between unity and non-unity, and as such is only a temporary, relative
truth, not a transcendental truth.
The self is constructed, not inherent. Its existence as a transcendental truth, as a
given in the European tradition, stems from a belief in the ability of the signified to
transmit its meaning as a signifier, a belief that our language reflects the operations of
reality. Descartes’ contention that the subject exists because the French language
grammatically requires a subject misses the true nature of language, a system of
differentiation in constant flux, in which truths are only ever provisionally and relatively
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meaningful. That the will or reason dominate a unity is one pole of a binary, and is in
some perspectives and moments truthful, yet its opposite, that there is no unity
inherent in the firing of so many neurons, that the will and reason are just two more
forces alongside the desires and illogic, competing yet never controlling, must then also
be at some moments truthful.
With such an understanding of the self, Derrida seems to proceed in a
contradictory fashion. He argues that the self must move into the world without stability
of purpose, yet this self is itself without stability of self. How can I advocate for the voice
of the other within the dominant discourse if my ‘I’ is not unified, a construction only
provisionally existent, a differentiation which carries the destabilizing trace of all other
meaning? As Derrida argues that the writing of the dominant discourse in light of the
effects of différance is a sort of double writing, that the discourse is both systematically
unified yet in itself divided, so he seems to propose a sort of double understanding of
the self. The self and its stability of purpose are both problematized, shown to be
provisionally useful, yet despite the always present uncertainty of truth we must still
move forward into action.
Derrida wants to destabilize logocentrism from the inside, to use its terms and
structures to press the truth that there are no transcendental truths. Yet to some extent,
this approach will always be mired in the fundamental violence against truth which this
tradition has been performing since its inception. If the dominant discourse depends
upon its opposite pole of minority discourse in order to remain dominant, will the
deconstruction of such structures from the interior, as a minority discourse, ever fully
rectify the dominance of the dominant discourse, this metaphysics of presence? It
seems that, given the truthfulness of the lack of truth in transcendental signifiers, and in
philosophies which claim certainty (even the certainty of the instability of certainty),
one would be more in line with the true workings of the world by distancing oneself
from logocentrism, by casting off the constructed sense of self in order to become more
attuned to the raw and constant becoming of the world which language and all its
attempts to signify it can only obscure and violate. This is the approach I read in the
writing of the Chinese Daoist Zhuangzi, an argument which I will construct next, in the
4th chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Deconstruction of the Chinese Self

Section 4.1: The Purpose of This Conceptual Structure

In the three preceding chapters I have established the constructions of the self in
European and Chinese philosophy, as well as the deconstruction of the European self by
Nietzsche and Derrida. In this, the fourth chapter, I will demonstrate the deconstructive
approach of Chinese Daoist thinker Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi was born sometime around 370
BC, a few hundred years after Confucius. In the same way in which Nietzsche would
sometimes initiate fictional dialogues with his philosophical foil, Socrates, Zhuangzi’s
work has multiple references to Confucius, often casting him in mock discussions with
his disciples in which he laments the Daoist’s general disregard for proper ritual,
sometimes seeming to envy their superior connection with the Way.
Interestingly, Zhuangzi’s philosophy of deconstruction carries a strong
resemblance to Derrida’s, despite their cultural and temporal differences. While some
part of this perceived similarity is likely a result of my cultural background, the
similarities seem too strong to ignored. While the marked differences between the
European and Chinese constructions of self illustrate the self’s constructed, arbitrary
nature, I believe the similarities between the European and Chinese methods of
deconstruction point to the universal nature of the problems with language in
expressing reality and truth.
I will begin my construction of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction in the second section,
starting with an exploration of the concept of the 道 dao, or Way, and the implications
of such an understanding of the world on the nature of truth. In the third section I
examine Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of the Confucian self based on the principles of the
dao. The primary concern for Zhuangzi is that discussion of binaries like virtue and nonvirtue draws the subject away from a true understanding of virtue, and moreover
pursuit of knowledge and deliberate action lead away from attunement with the Way.
I continue in section 4.4 with the positive aspect of the Zhuangzi I have
constructed, his advice for how to live a more skillful life in accordance with the
constantly becoming nature of the world. This will require us to stop attempting to
order reality, to not cling to our position in the field of aesthetic order as the center of a
focus-field, but to instead be at ease in the flow of existence, not privileging one
particular state of becoming over another. Finally, I show that, because Zhuangzi must
enter conventional language and thought in order to understand the necessity of
forgetting conventional language and thought, he shares the paradox which Nietzsche
and Derrida seem to encounter as they attempt to deconstruct from the interior.
While Nietzsche rebuilds the tradition in his own image, and Derrida accepts his
place as an ever-present problematizer, Zhuangzi offers a third alternative. Like most
Chinese texts at the time, including The Analects of Confucius, The Zhuangzi is composed
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of small chapters of writing attributed to Zhuangzi, with later chapters of further
commentary by notable scholars. However, Zhuangzi’s writing style is an extreme
example, filled with strange tales and stranger characters, complete disregard for the
fourth wall, and an affinity for perplexing analogies which cause us to question the
sureness with which we know the things we think we know. Zhuangzi leaves his work in
pieces, without any clear argument, and peppered with admonitions that he has no idea
what he’s talking about. In this way, Zhuangzi leaves his thought unconstructed, his
fantastic tales pushing us to think beyond what our intellect can circumscribe with logic.
Because each commentator must build his own construction of what he believes
Zhuangzi to be arguing, Zhuangzi has left his body of thought to the constant play of
new meaning, rather than willingly entering into the dominant discourse.
In the last section, the fifth, I compare Zhuangzi’s deconstruction to his European
counterparts. This will begin with a comparison of Derrida’s différance to Zhuangzi’s dao.
Both concepts can be defined as the process of differing, and both are described as
indescribable, unable to be circumscribed by language because their occurrence is
always prior to language. I argue that it is possible both Derrida and Zhuangzi had the
same thing in mind, with the differences between the terms attributable to the different
conceptual tools available to the thinkers. While Derrida did his thinking in 1960’s
France, amidst the intellectual turmoil of the structuralism movement, his description of
the ‘unnameable mover’ is linguistically based, caught up in his work on semiotics and
grammatology. In contrast, Zhuangzi lived in a time where 氣 qi, or ‘vital energy’ was
commonly accepted as the causal force behind illness, fortune, and the weather.
Lastly, I want to examine the difference between Zhuangzi’s understanding of
the self and Derrida’s. The self for Zhuangzi is not the same as the European conception,
i.e., it is not a conceptual unified self able to rationally examine itself. Rather, the self for
Zhuangzi is merely a certain quality which has a propensity for deliberate action and
applying order to the world, traits which Zhuangzi believes detract from true harmony
with a constantly becoming world. Chris Jochim conjectures that an understanding of
self similar to Zhuangzi’s is present in the works of Homer, a predecessor of Plato,
adding weight to the argument that the Western self as rationally directed began with
Plato. I offer this as an explanation for Derrida’s insistence that we remain with the
dominant tradition, in constant unease, while Zhuangzi advocates un-involvement with
debate and the pursuit of knowledge, despite the similarity of the two thinker’s
philosophy. While Zhuangzi viewed something like a government job as an opportunity
for one to be used by others, like a tree which is cut down for timber, Derrida’s
conception of his self as rationally unified and goal-oriented drove him to dedicate his
life to problematizing the dominant tradition.

Section 4.2: Zhuangzi’s Dao and the Relativity of Truth
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It seems right to begin any articulation of the meaning of the 道 dao or Way,
with the first two lines of Laozi’s 道德經 or Dao De Jing. They read: 道可道非常道， 名
可名非常名, dao ke dao feichang dao, ming ke ming feichang ming. Here Laozi appears
to be playing on way that the characters dao, way, and ming, name, can be both nouns
and verbs. Dao as a verb can also mean to show, so the translation is something like:
The way which can be shown is not the true Way (the dao which can be dao-ed is not
the true dao), the name which can be named is not the true Name (the ming which can
be ming-ed is not the true ming). That is to say, the dao is prior to language, and defies
our attempts to define it. It is the vital energy which moves the becoming of the world.
Zhuangzi offers a very helpful analogy which helps us to understand the dao by
way of showing its effects, by pointing to what is not. He frames this description as a
discussion between two men, Ziqi and Ziyou. Ziqi tells Ziyou that he has lost himself, but
that he would not understand because he does not hear the piping of earth or
Heaven.115 At Ziyou’s prompting, Ziqi describes the piping of earth:
The towering trees of the forest, a hundred spans around, are riddled with
indentations and holes—like noses, mouths, ears; like sockets, enclosures,
mortars; like ponds, like puddles. Roarers and whizzers, scolders and sighers,
shouters, wailers, boomers, growlers! One leads with a yeee! Another answers
with a yuuu! A light breeze brings a small harmony, while a powerful gale makes
for a harmony vast and grand. And once the sharp wind has passed, all these
holes return to their silent emptiness.116

Ziyou understands this to be the piping of the earth, and the “sound of bamboo
panpipes” to be the piping of man, but he still does not understand the piping of Heaven,
the dao. Ziqi responds, “it gusts through all the ten thousand differences, allowing each
to go its own way. But since each one selects out its own, what identity can there be for
the rouser?”
In other words, the dao is the force which blows through all existence, allowing
for the differentiation of things from each other. The analogy comparing the dao and
the world to wind and pipes implies that the multitude of things in the world could not
be differentiated without the dao, as the pipes could not sound without wind blowing
over them. In this way, the dao can be understood as the process of differing. Ziqi’s
analogy also provides insight into the un-nameable nature of the dao. He concludes,
“what identity can there be for the rouser?” To attempt to name the dao is to make it a
thing differentiated from other things, a hole which allows sound to be made. Yet as
soon as we try to name the dao, we realize that we have failed in the attempt, for we
cannot say that the wind itself is the sound of one of the holes, or the hole itself. As the
process of differing, the dao is present beyond the play of language, it is the wind which
enables the piping and so cannot be narrowed down to a specific hollow or noise.
It should be noted here that the translation of 天 tian as heaven does not carry any Western Christian connotation,
referring instead to the Chinese understanding of the celestial bodies and immortal deities.
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Yet it is also the case that the dao does not exist independently from the
differentiation of things. While the holes cannot “yeee!” or “yuuu!” without the wind,
the wind also cannot blow in a vacuum, devoid of the holes. The process of differing
occurs only when differentiation is present.
With such an understanding of the nature of the world, human perceptions of
right and wrong become problematized. Because there is nothing inherent in the world
beyond the play of dao, it is impossible to establish a fixed perspective from which to
posit objective truths, for what there is to talk about is always mutating, in a constant
state of becoming. So Zhuangzi argues, “for our understanding can be in the right only
by virtue of a relation of dependence on something, and what it depends on is always
peculiarly unfixed.”117 If humans generate meaning through relations, there cannot be
stable meaning if what is related is always in a state of flux.
If all definitions or truths are only meaningful in relation to other terms, if good
is only meaningful in relation to evil, then there can only be good if evil is also present—
a term depends on the binary it participates in for meaning, and nothing else. As
Zhuangzi describes it, all things are both a ‘this’ and a ‘that,’ yet we can only know of
‘that’ from ‘this.’ In other words, all things can be said to belong to either part of a
general binary, all things can be said to be both ‘here’ and ‘there,’ yet it is only from
‘here’ that we can understand ‘there.’ He continues, “thus, we can say: ‘that’ emerges
from ‘this,’ and ‘this’ follows from ‘that’. . . . their simultaneous generation is their
simultaneous destruction, and vice versa.”118 When ‘this’ is posited, its generation
simultaneously produces a ‘that’ as what it is differentiated against. Yet because they
must be generated simultaneously, they are also destroyed simultaneously, as their
essential paring eliminates the possibility that they could be meaningful independently.
Zhuangzi concludes, “thus the Sage does not proceed from any one of them
alone but instead lets them all bask in the broad daylight of Heaven. And that too is only
a case of going by the rightness of the present ‘this.’”119 Letting all ‘thises’ and ‘thats’
‘bask in the broad daylight of Heaven’ is to let the various formulations of truth all
unfold in the flow of the dao, following them when they are correct but instantly letting
them go when they are no longer necessary. “Going by the rightness of the present ‘this’”
here means that the Sage recognizes his humanness, that to let all conceptualizations be
equally valid is only necessary if one is confined to language to generate meaning. Were
the Sage a different ‘this,’ i.e., were he a different form of the ‘ten thousand things’
through which the dao passes through, something other than human, he would go by a
different ‘this.’ To have such an understanding is to both ‘go by the rightness of the
present this,’ and to let all ‘thises’ and ‘thats’ ‘bask in the broad daylight of Heaven.’
Zhuangzi’s primary concern with the current state of society is that very few
people follow the Sage’s lead. Instead, people believe that because they use language to
create differentiations, they must therefore understand what is being differentiated,
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and further that the differentiations they have formed are present in reality. So he
states, “the mind comes to be what it is by taking possession of whatever it selects out
of the process of alternation—but does that mean it has to truly understand that
process?. . . to claim that there are any such things as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ before they
come to be fully formed in someone’s mind in this way. . . . This is to regard the
nonexistent as existent.”120 Zhuangzi acknowledges the fact that the human mind forms
meaning through differentiation, ‘the process of alternation,’ but refutes the claim that
such alternations are therefore inherent in the world. Right and wrong exist only to the
extent that we think them, but such things cannot be found beyond the subject’s
projection of meaning.
Zhuangzi not only rejects any natural connection between language and truth,
he also wants to show that the generation of seemingly objective meaning is the
product of an incomplete understanding of language. So he states, “Courses are formed
by someone walking them. Things are so by being called so. Whence thus and so? From
thus and so being affirmed of them. Whence not thus and so? From thus and so being
negated of them.”121 Although a common understanding of language is that we see a
‘thus’ and then name it ‘thus,’ when one really understands that meaning is simply
symbolic differentiation, we can see that a ‘thus’ is only a ‘thus’ when it is named as
such.

Section 4.3: The Problem with Culture

The Confucian tradition was just beginning to flourish during Zhuangzi’s lifetime,
and Confucius appears several times in Zhuangzi’s work, at times seeming to challenge
the Daoist perspective, while at other times arguing for it. One possible explanation for
this is that by sometimes putting his message in the mouth of his opponent, Zhuangzi is
disorienting our sense of ‘this’ and ‘that,’ preventing us from keeping straight where the
lines of opposition lay. In this way, the form of his work enforces the philosophical
message.
In the fourth chapter of The Zhuangzi, Confucius is in a dialogue with a disciple,
Yan Hui, a form often taken up in the Analects of Confucius. Yan Hui expresses interest
in travelling to a nearby state which is in turmoil, hoping to do the virtuous thing and
assist in their statecraft, and asks Confucius for advice. After berating Yan Hui for his
ignorance, Zhuangzi’s Confucius says, “do you know what it is that undermines real
Virtuosity, and for what purpose, on the contrary, ‘cleverness’ comes forth? Virtuosity is
undermined by getting a name for it. Cleverness comes forth from conflict.”122
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Virtuosity and knowledge, translated here as cleverness, are two of the most important
traits the real Confucius pushes his students to cultivate within themselves in the
Analects. Yet here Zhuangzi’s Confucius seems to challenge one’s ability to achieve such
things, that real Virtuosity is undermined by naming it Virtuosity.
Zhuangzi’s Confucius continues, “for a good name is most essentially a way for
people to one-up each other, and cleverness is most essentially a weapon for winning a
fight. Both are inauspicious implements, not the kind of thing that can be used to
perfect your own behavior.”123 Here Zhuangzi’s Confucius is speaking with an
understanding of language’s arbitrary nature, such that to name virtuosity is already to
get away from a true understanding of what virtuosity is. What the disciple Yan Hui is
seeking here, in his ignorance of the dao, is not true virtuosity but the named virtuosity,
not true knowledge but named knowledge. Rather than moving us toward a greater
understanding of real virtuosity and knowledge, to pursue them by ‘getting a name for it’
is only useful in societal competition with others, through pointless debate or the
knowledge of how to exploit the other.
Confucius appears again in Chapter 6, this time attempting to describe to his
disciple Zigong why Daoists act the way they do. Zigong has just returned from a funeral,
where two of the deceased’s friends unceremoniously sing him away: “Hey Sanghu, Hey
Sanghu! / Come on back, why don’t you? / You’ve returned to what we are really, /
While we’re still humans—wow, yippee!”124 For Confucians, participation in ritual is the
means to self cultivation, what makes one human, and no ritual is more sacred than the
funeral.
Yet here these men sit, irreverently singing a silly song at the deathbed of their
friend. Zhuangzi’s Confucius, here seeming to espouse a Daoist perspective, replies,
“those who serve each other in the Course do so by not being bothered to serve any
one particular goal, thereby allowing the flow of their lives to settle into stability. Thus it
is said, fish forget one another in the rivers and lakes, and human beings forget one
another in the arts of the Course.”125 For these two Daoist mourners, what brings
stability in life is not ‘being bothered to serve any one particular goal,’ but instead
following along in the flow of becoming. Somewhat counter-intuitively to us, for
Zhuangzi we are at our most stable when we are fully at one with the chaos of becoming,
such that measures which prevent our going with the flow—deliberate action or the
pursuit of status and material wealth—actually destabilize us, because they allow us to
be used by others, investing us in the system and distracting us from the pleasures of
becoming.
Again in chapter 4, Confucius is used to deliver Zhuangzi’s message, saying, “Can
you afford to be careless? Let yourself be carried along by things so that the mind
wanders freely. Hand it all over to the unavoidable so as to nourish what is central
within you. That is the most you can do. What need is there to deliberately seek any
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reward? The best thing is just to fulfill what’s mandated to you, your fate—how could
there be any difficulty in that?”126 While the typical person would argue that to ‘hand it
all over to the unavoidable’ is ‘to be careless,’ in the Zhuangzian illogic, to be careless is
to deliberately seek reward, because it will have wasted what is truly stable within us by
pursuing what is important only in a cultural sense.

Section 4.4: Implications for Skillful Action

I have built up an opposition in Zhuangzi’s work between the deliberate pursuit
of cultural reward and the non-purposeful action of following along with the play of the
dao. It now becomes clear that Zhuangzi sees cultural participation as a tool, something
useful in passing but not worth devoting one’s life to. For the sage, steeped in an
understanding of the dao’s play, even being human is just another ‘this’ to be
temporarily acknowledged. So Zhuangzi describes, “the sage has his ways of wandering.
For him, understanding is merely a bastard son, obligations and agreements merely
glue, Virtuosity a mere continuation of something received, skill merely
salesmanship.”127 The traits cultivated by the Confucian self, traits said to be
fundamental to being human, are for the Zhuangzian sage merely useful in passing,
applicable to a certain situation but not necessary for the stability of his own being.
On the contrary, things like understanding, obligations, Virtuosity, and skill can
only hinder the formation of a self which is stable in the constant instability of becoming,
by attempting to posit a stable self using the unstably founded norms of language and
culture. So he concludes, “the sage makes no plans, so what use would he have for
understanding? He is unsplit, so what use would he have for glue? He loses nothing, so
what use would he have for the attainments of Virtuosity? He is not for sale as a
commodity, so what use would he have for salesmanship?”128 If culture is a production
of language, whose referent is always ‘peculiarly unfixed,’ then it does not take into
account the constantly becoming nature of the world in its pursuit of stability. Therefore,
our cultural tenets actually de-stabilize us by attempting to posit their own stability
ignorant of the change in the world. To be truly stable is to be stable in the constant flux
of becoming.
Therefore, in order to find inner stability we must stop attempting to order the
outer world based upon our cultural predispositions. The Confucian self perceives order
as a field focused around the center, such that in a family the mother and son are
ordered and cultivated by the father, who in turn is ordered and cultivated by the focusfield through his place at its center. Such a formulation of order can only be applicable
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from a certain perspective, from ‘this,’ and so cannot be said to be inapplicable from a
different perspective, from ‘that.’ Because its applicability is simultaneously generated,
it is also simultaneously destroyed. Ultimately, order is only as applicable as the
particular situation dictates, and cannot be said to be universally applicable, much less
the basis of all further conceptions of order, as is the case in the Confucian view. For
Zhuangzi, the true way to impose order is to find your place within the piping of tian:
“let your mind roam in the flavorless, blend your vital energy with the boundless silence,
follow the rightness of the way each thing already is without allowing yourself the least
bias. Then the world will be in order.”129
Zhuangzi’s work is filled with examples of people who perform skills with the
utmost deftness, who lose themselves in the flow of their work, only becoming
conscious of themselves once they finish their skillful activity. The most famous of these
‘knack stories’ features Cook Ding, a man who carves oxen in the king’s kitchen. The king,
delighted with his skill, asks Cook Ding to describe how he handles the knife. Cook Ding
responds,
What I love is the Course, something that advances beyond mere skill. When I
first started cutting up oxen, all I looked at for three years was oxen, and yet still
I was unable to see all there was to see in an ox. But now I encounter it with the
spirit rather than scrutinizing it with the eyes. My understanding consciousness,
beholden to its specific purposes, comes to a halt, and thus the promptings of
the spirit begin to flow.130

This state of mind has most likely been experienced by everyone, in the heat of a sport,
while cleaning a room, or just in the pleasantness of a long walk. What is important for
Zhuangzi is that the ‘understanding consciousness’ only impedes skillful action, for
although it is useful in generating differentiations and thinking abstract thought, what
we use when we are engrossed in skillful activity is something entirely different. As Cook
Ding confesses, he approaches the oxen with his spirit, with his love of the dao, rather
than with his eyes. Instead of conceptualizing the meat as oxen, and himself as cook, the
knife as knife, and then attempting to bring these things together, Cook Ding
approaches the undifferentiated oneness of ox, knife and self as an undifferentiated
oneness, letting the dao direct his movements. In this way, his understanding of the
world perfectly reflects the way the world actually is. It is not the case that there is ox,
knife and self in reality, and he then comes to know them through his senses. Rather,
there is before perception only a oneness, and by not differentiating it into various
pieces, by allowing his spirit rather than his eyes to perceive, Cook Ding is able to
perceive the actual nature of reality as a oneness.
Like Nietzsche and Derrida after him, Zhuangzi’s thought seems to carry a certain
paradox. In order for Zhuangzi’s argument to be sensible we must enter the dominant
discourse, yet his conclusion seems to be that entering the dominant discourse is the
last thing we should do. Zhuangzi sees himself as an old tree out in the woods, and
would rather remain out there to grow in accord with the natural flow of things than to
129
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be cut down and put to use in the constructions of man. Yet still, Zhuangzi must enter
conventional language in order to understand the necessity of forgetting conventional
language. Zhuangzi’s response to this paradox is wrapped up in the very style and form
which his text takes. Rather than a series of logical progressions demonstrating his
argument, Zhuangzi presents us with a chaos of fantastical tales, dialogues with
Confucius which would never have taken place, and absolutely illogical analogies. These
not only serve to obscure his own structure, preventing it from being made into the
lumber of someone else’s deliberate action, but also cause the reader to question his
own conceptual sense of the world, priming us for authentic interaction with the dao.

Section 4.5: The Zhuangzian Self in Contrast with the European Self

At this point, we must recognize the profound similarities between Zhuangzi’s 道
dao and Derrida’s différance. Both are un-nameable because they are the process of
differentiation, and thus neither are a transcendental signifier but only occur when
differentiation occurs. By allowing for differentiation to occur they allow for meaning to
be produced in language, and subsequently in culture. Yet it is because culture does not
understand the contingent nature of truth due to the play of dao or différance that they
mistakenly posit universal truths and establish dominance. One could easily read this
passage from The Zhuangzi as Derrida’s own words: “this is certainly something close to
hand, and yet we do not know what makes it so. If there is some controller behind it all,
it is peculiarly devoid of any manifest sign. Its ability to flow and stop makes its presence
plausible, but even then it shows no definite form. That would make it a reality with no
definite form.”131
Yet, given such a similar understanding of the becoming of existence, Derrida
chooses to throw himself into the deliberate pursuit of cultural reform while Zhuangzi
would rather be out in the world, at one with the dao and beholden to no purpose but
his own. I believe the reason for this is rooted in the difference between the two
thinker’s self conception, specifically, that Derrida has a rational, ethically unified self
which sets deliberate life plans, while Zhuangzi does not.
We must first make sense of Zhuangzi’s understanding of self, a particularly
difficult task given the dominance of our western understanding. I will rely heavily upon
Chris Jochim’s analysis here. In the Zhuangzi, 身 shen, generally meaning body, refers to
the true self, that thing which becomes stable when we go along with the instability of
becoming rather than pursuing deliberate action.132 In this way, Zhuangzi does have
some understanding that there is a fundamental self, but we should not attach to it any
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of the ideas we usually associate with the self. Here, self is meant in the barest sense. As
Jochim writes, this concept reflects “a pluralistic conception of the person, not a unitary
one built concentrically around an inner, spiritual core. . . . there is no place within this
conception for a mind-body dualism.”133
When Zhuangzi advocates that we lose ourselves in the flow, this is not the
western understanding of self which we must lose, for Zhuangzi did not know of such a
self. Rather, this self which must be lost is 己 ji, generally meaning self. Jochim
determines ji in the Zhuangzi to be a quality which prevents one from properly
harmonizing with others and the world, which drives us to pursue deliberate action and
knowledge. However, this is still not the western interpretation. As Jochim comments,
“ji suggests something like ‘egoism’; it does not mean ‘the self.’134
Therefore, when one has lost ji and been taken up in the flow of becoming, no
egoism is present, either in the western or eastern sense. Instead, there is only shen, the
body, the barest sense of the self, as a thing which can be differentiated from the world,
but which is in reality at oneness with it. As Zhuangzi exclaims, “without that there
would be no me, to be sure, but then again without me there would be nothing selected
out from it all.”135 Jochim describes this sense of self as devoid of any western notions of
self, “in this state, there was no Cartesian residue, no authentic transcendental cogito,
there was simply a ‘person’ unaware of anything that distinguished him from the flow of
all living things.”136
Interestingly, Jochim contends that the self as Zhuangzi conceives it may have
been present in the works of the Greek poet Homer, who produced works like the Iliad
and the Odyssey before Plato was born. It is generally accepted that the heroes
populating Homer’s epic poems had an incomplete sense of self when compared to the
modern western conception. Men like Achilles and Odysseus were motivated by the
Gods, the Fates, and their emotions, and although they had rationality they did not
seem to have a critical, self-reflective element of the self. As Jochim writes, “. . .I have
come to believe that Homer had a pluralistic conception of the person parallel to
Zhuang’s conception of personhood as something without a unitary self behind the
thoughts, habits, actions, feelings, and so forth of which we are made. Of course, their
views of personhood may be otherwise quite different.”137 The presence of this ‘prewestern-self self’ in Homer’s work would place the conceptualization of a self which has
a criticizing element distinct from the rest of the self, an element believed to be reason
itself and nothing more, squarely upon Plato’s shoulders.
Such a conception of self, as begun in the works of Plato, and continued, for
example, in the subsequent works of Augustine, Descartes, Nietzsche, and Derrida,
drives the self to direct its life in rational, ethical action due to its ability to oversee and
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dictate the other elements of self. We cannot help but find the sort of life put forward
by Zhuangzi—in which one spends his life playing in the mud, cavorting with trees, not
keeping track of years—to be starkly immoral. To live as Zhuangzi advocates would be to
waste the lifetime, mind, and body given to us so that we can go into the world to
rationally solve its problems. Given such an understanding, we can begin to understand
why Nietzsche and Derrida, despite finding such deeply rooted issues with western
culture, continued to hammer away at it, believing the problem could be solved with the
unified action of a rational self.
Westerners also have the sort of experiences encountered in Zhuangzi’s ‘knack
tales,’ like Cook Ding’s skillfulness with the blade, ox, and self in following the flow
rather than deliberate action. Yet to the western interpretation, with the rational self
transcendentally present, such a flow state is seen as a distraction from goal-setting and
the presence of self. Jochim describes the Hungarian psychologist Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi’s analysis of the flow state: “. . .he acknowledges that goalconsciousness disappears during flow. In relation to this, the ‘joy’ of flow results from
the effortless involvement that lays one’s troubles aside as well as from the fact that,
during flow, ‘concern for the self’ is gone.”138
The language used to describe the flow state by westerners must be stressed.
Here, it is a matter of goal-consciousness disappearing, that enjoyment comes from
laying one’s troubles aside, such that ‘concern for the self’ fades. What is implied is that
the self fundamentally has goal-consciousness, that a concern for the self is always
present except in special circumstances. In contrast, for Zhuangzi, the flow state is the
true state of being, and goal-consciousness and concern for the self are extras which
obscure an authentic existence with the becoming of the world. From this perspective,
we can conclude that, although Zhuangzi did not know of the western conception of self,
he would have denied it as strongly as he denied 己 ji, if not more so.
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Conclusion
This section will conclude the examination of the self and its deconstruction
across European and Chinese philosophy, formulating what has been learned from such
an exploration. We should begin with a review of what has been covered so far. In the
introduction, I identify the self as a conceptual structure which seems to distort an
otherwise proper understanding of the world, and moreover that conceptual structures
themselves are arbitrary, and should be viewed merely as tools rather than direct
representations of truth. I make the claim that morality is a tool which allows cultures to
exercise power over the population. I sketch out two notions which I want to explore,
first, the ‘mirror-self,’ a common Buddhist and Daoist image representing a manner of
being which brings nothing extra to the understanding of the self beyond what is in the
world, perfectly reflecting the way of things around them. The second notion is a
phenomena I have encountered and dubbed, for lack of a better term, no-self
confidence, a certain lack of inhibition and doubt produced when we encounter the
world without the concept of self to intermediate between consciousness and action.
Finally, I declare my intent to examine the traditional notions of the self as conceived in
European and Chinese philosophy, followed by an examination of the European and
Chinese philosophies of deconstruction which challenge traditional philosophy.
Ultimately, I predict a tension between the self which acts within culture and the self
which denies the value of any such action. I pose the questions: When do we watch?
When do we act? And on what grounds do we do either?
Following the introduction, the first chapter examines the traditional European
self as formulated in the philosophies of Plato, Augustine and Descartes. This
formulation of self is characterized by the existence of a rational element of the self
which is able to survey the other elements of the self, the spirit or desires, and control
them in a rational fashion. Descartes further develops the idea of an unlimited will, a
faculty of the self which supersedes understanding and rationality, unifying the self and
directing its actions. The justification for such a formulation of self is the belief in
language’s ability to accurately reflect reality, as well as a purported access to things
which are true in and of themselves, a claim which invests all further claims with its
truth. This is the Idea of the Good for Plato, and later God for Augustine and Descartes,
concepts discoverable only by turning away from the sensory world to the independent
self.
In the second chapter I address the traditional Chinese conception of the self, as
put forward in the Analects of Confucius. In this conception, the self is the social roles
one plays, both in the family and in culture at large. The Confucian self is a process, not
a ruling element, a process which must be cultivated over time through participation in
culture. Self cultivation is enacted through participation in ritual, social traditions like
funerals. Participation in ritual is to be human, such that to not participate in culture is
to be less than human. Such a self tends to view order aesthetically as opposed to
logically, considering each part in determining the whole, rather than considering the
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whole in determining each part. When such a harmonious order is achieved, all of the
parts are cultivated through their participation in the whole.
At this juncture it is evident that the European and Chinese traditions have
produced markedly different conceptions of the self. The Europeans posit a self whose
course is determined through independent, rational thought, a rationality removed
from and able to dominate the emotional milieu of the lesser elements of the self. In
contrast, the course of the Chinese self is determined interdependently with others, and
requires a cultivation of the self through participation in culture. Because these
conceptions of self are so different, and because certain crucial elements of each are so
lacking in the other, neither can be said to be innate. If they are not innate, then they
must be constructed.
Chapter three covers the deconstruction of the European self through Nietzsche
and then Derrida. This deconstruction demonstrates that language and all meaning
derived from it can only be produced by differentiating between two concepts, and thus
that truth can only be relative, serving a specific purpose. Traditional European
philosophy derives its legitimacy from a belief that reality is meaningful in the same way
as language, and that certain words can be meaningful in and of themselves, beliefs
which are both disproven. Rather, Nietzsche shows any claim to rationality or higher
truth is more accurately a production of the philosopher’s emotions and unstated goals,
the will to power. Therefore, the self is not truly unified or ruled by any one faculty. This
allows me to formulate my own argument, that culture is now the dominant
manifestation of mankind’s will to power. Finally, Derrida contends that given the
constructed nature of the dominant tradition and the self, we have an undeniable
responsibility to question our actions and their justifications.
The fourth chapter presents the Daoist Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of the Chinese
self. Zhuangzi’s deconstructive arguments, techniques, and even metaphors often
closely mirror Derrida’s, demonstrating that although structures may be very different,
their constructedness and subsequent deconstruction follow similar channels. Zhuangzi
argues that language and the pursuit of status and knowledge prevent us from
understanding the world as it really is, a constantly becoming world rather than one of
fixed entities and beings. Zhuangzi advocates for a loss of self, with self here being
understood as a propensity for deliberate action which interrupts harmony with the 道
or Way. Further, there is evidence that such an understanding of self—a self which does
not believe in a unifying transcendental rationality—exists in the work of Homer, i.e.,
before Plato. Finally, I argue that Derrida carried such a self conception, which caused
him to continue to participate in the dominant culture, while Zhuangzi did not, causing
him to instead advocate that we distancing ourselves from culture.
In order to really conclude such an exploration of the structures of self, I believe
we must return to the binary between culture and self previously established. First, we
must review the relationship, then, we can explore the implications.
As Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power argues, all existence is the competition
of different forces struggling to dominate the other. One arbitrary manifestation of this
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will to power is life itself, followed by more developments which increase life’s power
quotient—multi-cellular organisms, the nervous system, consciousness, rationality, a
sense of self, and finally, culture.
The English word culture traces its origins to the Anglo-Norman and Middle
French culture in the 12th century, meaning the “action of cultivating land, plants, etc.” It
is not until the 1500s that culture takes on connotations of the development of language
and literature. Interestingly, it also carries traces of religious worship, as in cultivation.139 The Chinese is 文化, wen hua. 文 is to inscribe, as in language, but also carries
connotations of elegance. 化 is originally to smelt, to transmute, and here can be
compared to the English word part –ation, as in civilize(文)–ation(化).140 In both
languages, the concept of culture carries the idea that there is cultivation afoot, of
taking what is raw and original and making it civilized. It is worth noting that for the
Chinese such an understanding of the word culture is ancient, given, while for the
Europeans it was not until the 1500s that the meaning of culture shifted from purely
horticultural to applying to human society.
Yet culture’s connotations of cultivation also speaks to the power relationship
between culture and the self. As the individual cell of a multi-cellular organism is
provided for, yet also dominated by, the organism itself, so the individual human is
provided for, yet also dominated by, the culture which raises him. Culture cultivates us
to develop a notion of self, because such a configuration allows for more advanced
interaction with society and a greater ability to set abstract goals and achieve them,
making us, and in turn, culture, more powerful. In this way, Culture’s cultivation of man
empowers us, enabling us to achieve things we could never aspire to alone, yet it also
dominates us, causing us to enslave, suppress and discriminate against others, human or
otherwise.
Given our deconstructive understanding of binaries, we know that culture is
sometimes a unity, sometimes a non-unity. Ants have no central ordering consciousness,
no transcendental unity, yet together through their natural expression of life the
collective acts out the functions of an organism. In this sense perhaps culture is also
blind, a collective of individuals which, through their normal life cycles, act out the
functions of one vast organism. To the extent that culture is a unity, acting out this
fundamental play of life, perhaps we are unable to influence its monolithic advance. Yet
culture can also be said to be a non-unity, and to the extent that the whole of culture is
composed only of parts, of individual people, then surely we must have some degree of
control. If culture is a non-unity, then its direction is not shaped by the dominant
majority, but by the interplay of every subject, the force of each person’s will to power
at play within society. This is Derrida’s unavoidable responsibility, to be conscious that
we perpetuate culture even in passive participation, and that we must therefore assume
full responsibility for the course it takes. Whether or not we truly have access to
139
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culture’s direction does not seem like a question which we can definitively answer.
Either way, it seems to be beyond the ant’s comprehension.
Regardless, such an understanding of the binary between culture and self
renders a concrete lesson on how to live in the world. Foremost, as Confucius
demonstrates, participation in culture is what makes us human. Although it may
obscure a proper understanding of the world, we cannot turn away culture, cannot
digress to a lower state of power. Second, it is imperative to recognize that we are not a
unity, that we do not go into the world governed by reason and a unifying will. As
Derrida teaches, there must always be unease in ethical action, a questioning of our
motives and an instability in our perception of right and wrong. Culture may cultivate in
us belief in absolute truths, but we must always recognize these as inaccurate.
Yet there is also the lesson which Descartes demonstrates. In the same way in
which he contends that there are clear and distinct conceptions within him, which must
be true, I too feel that there is something within me which confirms the philosophy I
espouse as truthful. Nietzsche shows us the real meaning of this phenomenon, the force
of my emotion acting upon the construction of what I believe to be a rational argument.
Within the structure of these pages is a reflection of my base desires, my will to power: I
have seen the concrete other, poor black boys funneled into a life of crime and
oppression by the dominant majority which shirks responsibility for the ruining of these
lives with the rhetoric of meritocracy, the transcendental signifier of American
independence. My philosophy is a not impartial rational contemplation, it is a tool, a
means to power, a weapon, which I want beyond all else to demolish the American
power structure. To the extent that American culture is a non-unity, its direction is
shaped entirely by the parts which compose it, the interplay of these competing forces,
the exertion of each individual’s will to power manifested through their philosophy,
actions, and morality. Even though I am not of the majority, the microscopic cell which I
represent matters, for I am a part of the whole, and the whole is nothing but parts.
Finally, we must take to heart Zhuangzi’s lesson, that if the world is nothing but a
constant flow of becoming, we should not burden ourselves with conceptualizations
external to this flow, but instead be at ease in the ‘piping of tian,’ comfortable in the
non-unity of everything. Language can only generate temporary, relative truths, and
therefore the same must be said of man and culture. While for Western thinkers the
‘flow state’ is an interesting phenomena which temporarily distracts us from our having
a goal-oriented self, for Zhuangzi such non-conceptual, skillful action is acting out the
true nature of the world, being one with becoming rather than dissecting it with
language. In such a state of no-self confidence, we are not so much forgetting the
conceptual world as we are remembering what it is actually like to be in the world, fully,
without the intermediary of self or cultural judgments to utilize us.
For this is truly what participation in culture and having a self do to us, they
teach us to believe that things can be objectively true. In order to live life in a way which
more accurately reflects the arbitrary nature of language and the constant becoming of
existence, we must situate ourselves outside of the cultural truths which were cultivated
within us, recognizing that cultural norms shape the value judgments we project upon
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everything we perceive. To do this we must consider all selves and all cultures to have a
one-to-one truth value ratio, that no way of life is more or less correct. To do anything
less is to let a culture founded upon an incorrect understanding of existence dictate our
being in the world.
When we first encounter the idea of a parity between all cultures, the suggestion
that we must consider everything to be equally truthful, it seems to stop us in our tracks,
halting us from further moral action. However, what is really stopping us in our tracks is
our comfort within the metaphysics of presence, the conceptual sedative imparted to us
by culture which tells us that there is a clear and easily understood path to morally
correct action.
Therefore, the halting sensation must be passed over, seen as a first step. After
we have dealt with the urge to not listen to those who tell us there is instability in our
moral structures, we come upon a certain uncertainty. That we are now unsure of how
to proceed, questioning the extent to which our moral structures have been informed
by our culture—I think this is the correct feeling. If there is stability in our understanding,
it is a sign we are forgetting something, not a sign that we have complete understanding.
It feels as if we had a clear, stable path which has now been obscured by the process of
deconstruction. Yet really, what we had before in the stability of our culturally
supported beliefs was the obstruction, and the path of uncertainty, aware of the
problems of language and absolutes, this is what it really means to have a clear path.
When we feel that we are on the brink of something irreversible, that no matter
what we do it will not be the objectively right choice, then our path is clear of the halftruths and false goals which culture uses to guide us toward the pursuit of a shallower
happiness. When we have an awareness that no matter how we help, damage will also
be done, that we can only deconstruct by entering the structure, that our very basis for
action is inherently paradoxical, then I feel we are ready to take the first step.
Having a concept of self allows us to posit that we are governed by a unifying
force, allowing us to better interface with culture and direct our lives toward abstract
goals, and therefore the self must represent an increase in the subject’s power. It seems
unlikely that the westerner will ever be able to cast off such an understanding of himself.
Yet still I believe we are able to achieve Zhuangzi’s ideal of mirror self. As he describes it,
“the Consummate Person uses his mind like a mirror, rejecting nothing and welcoming
nothing: responding but not storing. Thus he can handle all things without harm.”141 I
believe we can still use our minds like a mirror, despite having a conception of self
which Zhuangzi did not.
To do this, we should not form an attachment to the self, but instead see it as a
construction, temporarily useful yet not inherent in us, able to form relative truths but
without access to absolute truth. We must see that our will to power wells up within us,
superseding any attempt at purely rational thought or action, placing responsibility
firmly upon the non-unity which we are. We should instead try to live out our lives with
minds like perfect mirrors, responding to the movements of the world but never
141
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attaching to anything beyond this movement. We must let the self be in our minds, but
should not attach to it, should not let it become dust on the mirror. In this way, the
truest self is the purely reflected self, appearing when appropriate but fading away as
soon as its temporary truth has been expended, allowing us to return to no-self
confidence, being at one with the world.
Moreover, we cannot let such an understanding draw us into believing we now
understand the world, for on the contrary, such a construction only shows us that we
know nothing.
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